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Bribery is one of the most serious types of corruption in China. However, what 
is the trend of bribery over years in China? What are the major factors that shape such 
trend? These questions are seldom raised in the existing literature. 
This thesis investigates and explores the trend of bribery in China in the period 
of 1998-2007 by using the official statistics—filed cases of bribery by the 
procuratorates. Possible reliability and validity threats of the data are discussed. 
Several possible factors explaining the trend of bribery proposed in current literature 
are tested, categorized into internal institutional factors and external environmental 
factors. Specifically, internal factors are factors related to the government itself, 
including sufficiency of anti-bribery policies and effectiveness of implementation of 
such policies. Effectiveness of implementation is affected by horizontal (lack of 
independence of juridical agencies) and vertical (central-local relations) supervision. 
External factors are those involve the government and private sectors (or market). The 
growth of private sectors and their increasing interactions with the government who 
has control over the market are examined. 
The analysis suggests that bribery has worsened in the period of 1998-2007. 
Such trend is shaped by two major factors: a) the ineffectiveness of the 
implementation of anti-bribery policies, and b) the expansion of government’s 
economic involvement measured by real estate investment and public investment, 
which provides more opportunities for bribery. Changes of provincial governor and 
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party secretary have no significant effects on bribery. The result is significant at both 
the national and provincial levels. However, the analysis of provincial-level data 
indicates that regional variations are significant, implying that there was no single 
anti-bribery method that would be effective for all provinces. Accordingly, when 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Corruption has been a chronic problem in China. From 2002 to 2007, 
disciplinary agencies have filed 677,924 corruption cases and punished 518,484 party 
members. Every year since 2002, around 100,000 of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) members (0.16%) were disciplined and punished.1 Among them 32 percent 
committed crimes and 16 percent are involved in economically corrupt activities in 
2006 (Pei 2007). According to Hu Angang, a famous Chinese economist, economic 
losses caused by corruption accounts for at least 13.2% to 16.8% of China’s GDP in 
the second half of the 1990s (Hu 2001). 
Besides the academia, political and public awareness of the problem of 
corruption is also high. Various surveys conducted during the last decade suggested 
that people from different backgrounds have the same perception that corruption is 
one of the most serious problems in China. For instance, the survey conducted by the 
CPC's Central Party School every year since 1997 shows that corruption has been 
ranked by the prefectural or departmental level officials as one of the top three most 
serious problems in China (Qing and Xie 1999, 2000b, 2000a; Xie 2001; Qing 2002; 
Xie 2003; Qing et al. 2004; Xie 2005; Qing 2006; Xie and Pan 2007). Surveys on 
university students, urban residents and net citizens also showed similar results, with 
corruption as one of the top three most serious social problems in China (zhongyang 
jiwei yanjiushi 2007; Ru et al. 1998-2008). 
Being aware of the public’s concern of the rampant corruption in China, the 
                                                        
1 http://news.hexun.com/2007-10-05/100830177.html 
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central authorities pay attention to the political consequence of it and emphasize that 
rampant corruption will corrode people’s confidence to CCP and the government and 
will eventually lead to the collapse of CCP’s ruling position. Jiang Zemin, at the 15th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, stated that corruption is a 
problem of the life and death of the party and the state (Jiang 1997). Hu Jingtao 
declares that CCP and corruption are as incompatible as fire and water.2 Given its 
prevalence and negative economic and political impacts, corruption has been one of 
the major agendas of CCP and the Chinese government. 
The main puzzle here is that expansive anti-corruption measures have 
coexisted with the worsening corruption over the last three decades. In the early 
reform era, corruption was considered as an individual problem and accordingly, the 
major countermeasure of corruption was campaign. In 1997, CCP leaders officially 
admitted that corruption was a systemic disease and began to rely more on 
institutional tools to curb it (Jiang 1997). Since then, CCP and the Chinese 
government have established and enacted a series of anticorruption initiatives and 
policies. Moreover, general institutional reforms have been introduced, which were 
expected to reduce room for corruption. Regarding the government per se, there have 
been comprehensive administrative reforms, covering administrative and fiscal 
decentralization, government procurement, auditing, administrative approval, and 
civil servants recruitment. As for the whole social and economic system, the process 
of marketization, privatization and globalization have also led to remarkable changes 
                                                        
2 http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-10-17/193514108076.shtml 
 7
of the environment where corruption lives. 
It is critical to distinguish the seriousness of corruption from its trend of 
severity over time. Considering the inner-government reforms and external 
environmental changes, the situation of corruption is expected to be improved. 
However, scholars have different views on the effectiveness of these anti-corruption 
activities. A majority of scholars argues that corruption has worsened despite CCP and 
the Chinese government’s anti-corruption efforts (Wederman 2004; Wedeman 2005; 
Lu 2000a; Guo 2008; Wedeman 2008). Some are even suspicious of CCP’s sincerity 
to combat corruption, arguing that anti-corruption efforts is merely an instrument to 
deal with economic overheating (Quade 2007) or a convenient tool for political 
struggle (He 2004). 
In contrast, Yang (2004) and Ko and Weng (2009b) insist the possibility of the 
progress in controlling Chinese corruption. According to the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate statistics, during 2003 to 2007, 179,696 corruption cases were filed and 
209,487 persons investigated, which are 13.2% and 9.9% lower than in the period of 
1998-2002. 3  Therefore, whether the situation of corruption in China has been 
worsened or not requires more careful reassessment.  
The existing literature has paid much attention to the nature and extent of 
corruption, yet there is a relative absence of analysis on the trend of corruption in 
China and major factors that shape such trend. Furthermore, since each type of 
corruption has different characteristics and are affected by different factors (Manion 
                                                        
3 http://www.spp.gov.cn/site2006/2008-06-05/0001818747.html 
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1996; Gong 1997; Sun 2004), we have to analyze the trends of them separately. 
Among the various types of corruption, embezzlement (贪污 tanwu), bribery (贿赂 
huilu) and misappropriation (挪用公款 nuoyong gongkuan) are the most serious in 
China, accounting for 32.5%, 23%, and 16% of all corruption cases filed by the 
procuratorates, respectively.4 Due to the limitation of space and sheer complexity of 
Chinese corruption, this thesis limits the scope of research to bribery.  
Bribery is selected as the major form of China’s corruption to study in the 
thesis for the following reasons. First, bribery is so prevalence all over the world that 
it is often conceived as the same as corruption in many major theories such as the 
structural-functionalism, rent seeking and principal-agent model (HeidenHeimer 1970; 
Lu 1999; Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1978). Some Chinese scholars even agree 
that corruption as an international crime is synonymous with crime of bribery defined 
in the Chinese Criminal Law (Sun 2006). 
Second, compared to embezzlement and misappropriation which only involve 
public officials, bribery often has more deceiving covers since officials and other 
parties collude to commit illegal exchange. Thus, it is more difficult to detect bribery 
than embezzlement and misappropriation. Since the 1980s, bribery has surpassed 
embezzlement and become the most prevalent form of corruption in contemporary 
China (Sun 2004: 53). In fact, as we will discuss it later, in the period of 1998-2007, 
bribery keeps increasing whereas embezzlement and misappropriation are decreasing.  
Last, and maybe the most important reason is that the growth and widespread 
                                                        
4 These figures are the average values of the percentages in 20 years, from 1988 to 2007.  
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of bribery has more political relevance than that of embezzlement and 
misappropriation. Bribery is the exchange of wealth and power between public 
officials and citizens. Due to the transaction nature between the public and private 
actors, ordinary citizens are often more exposed to bribery than to other types of 
corruption and are thus more sensitive to it (Manion 2004; Sun 2004). Therefore, 
bribery is closely related to people’s perception of corruption. Indeed, because of the 
political importance of bribery, most corruption students focus on it instead of other 
types of corruption (for example, see Rose-Ackerman 1999; Leff 1970). 
Given the various anti-corruption measures, comprehensive administrative 
reforms and impressive socio-economic changes since the 1990s, it is important to ask 
why the situation of bribery has still worsened, while those of other types of 
corruption have been improved. Surprisingly, although many scholars are aware of the 
uniqueness of bribery from other types of corruption and its political relevance, the 
trend of bribery is rarely studied. Some scholars discuss the characteristics and causes 
of bribery, but they do not pay attention to the trend of it over time (Manion 1996, 
2004; Sun 2004). Other scholars only examine the overall trend of corruption rather 
than the trends of specific types of it (Wedeman 2005, 2008; Guo 2008). 
This study aims to fill up the knowledge gap in current corruption literature on 
the trend of bribery and the factors shaping it. Accordingly, two research questions are 
proposed: (1) has the situation of bribery worsened in China despite the 
anti-corruption efforts of the Chinese government? (2) If so, what factors contribute to 
the growth of bribery? To answer the first question, I will examine whether the 
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increasing number of reported bribery cases implies the worsening of actual bribery 
situation in China. Possible reliability and validity threats will be discussed. To 
answer the second question, the analysis will be framed into internal institutional 
factors and external environmental factors. Based on this framework, four hypotheses 
will be developed to be tested in a preliminary examination. The first two hypotheses 
regard the internal institutional factors and will be tested by qualitative methods. 
Specifically, the question of whether the growth of bribery is due to the inefficiency of 
anti-bribery policies or because of the implementation problems or both will be 
answered. Another two hypotheses examine the impact of external factors including 
greater market exposure and premarket reforms on the trend of bribery. These two 
external factors will be measured by the development of real estate investment, and 
public investment and government procurement, respectively. Quantitative method 
will be applied to test the last two hypotheses. In addition, the impact of the change of 
provincial governor and provincial party secretary (PPS) and regional factor on the 
trend of bribery over time will also be examined as dummy variables. 
This thesis is organized as follows. In the chapter following this introduction, I 
will review the definition of corruption and bribery, as well as different causes of 
bribery proposed by current literature, both in English and Chinese publications. 
Based on the literature review, I will discuss my research questions and hypotheses in 
the third chapter. Research design and methods used in this thesis will also be 
discussed in the same chapter. In the fourth chapter, I will examine the trend of 
bribery in China in the period of 1998-2007, mainly at the national level. After 
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answering the question of whether bribery in China has worsened or not, the study 
will proceed to investigate the internal and external factors that explain the trend of 
bribery. Thus, in Chapter Five, anti-bribery policies will be reviewed to test whether 
the policies are sufficient. The implementation problem of anti-bribery policies will 
be examined in the following chapter. The seventh chapter will test the impact of 
external factors on the trend of bribery in the past decade. Multiple linear regressions 
will be run to test the hypotheses in this chapter. Finally, a conclusion chapter of this 















Chapter 2 Literature Review 
In this chapter, the definition of corruption in both general and Chinese 
literature will be reviewed. A working definition of Chinese corruption as well as a 
definition of bribery in China will be proposed then. After the conceptual discussion, I 
will review the causes of bribery provided in current literature on Chinese corruption, 
including both English-language and Chinese-language studies. I will figure out the 
main possible causes of bribery in contemporary China, which will be tested in this 
thesis. Based on this literature review, I will propose my research questions and 
hypotheses in next chapter. 
I. Definition of corruption and bribery 
(I) Corruption5 
Although students of corruption have tried to define the concept of corruption, 
they ended up acknowledging the difficulty of offering a definition of corruption that 
can be applied to countries with different contexts or the same country in different 
periods (Wang 2004; Johnston 2001; Philp 1997; Welch 1978; Caiden and Caiden 
1977; Xie 2006). A survey of definition of corruption in the existing literature shows 
that a definition of corruption generally includes an actor (public officials), behavior 
(illegality), and motive (private gains), although the specific meanings of them change 
over time. Moreover, the scope of corruption is gradually narrowed to “misbehaviors 
committed by public officials for their private gains” (Ko and Weng 2009a). This is 
consistent with Heidenheimer and Johnston’s survey, which shows a fairly high 
                                                        
5 Refer to Ko and Weng (2009a), on which this discussion is based on, for detailed discussion. 
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consensus among social scientists to conceive corruption in terms of transaction 
between power and wealth which illegitimately transfers public goods into private 
gains (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002).  
Although there are few studies on the conceptualization of Chinese corruption, 
various definitions of corruption can be found in the literature of Chinese corruption. 
According to Ko and Weng (2009a), most of these definitions limit the actors of 
corruption to public officials. Nevertheless, the meaning of public office could be 
different from that of other countries due to the CCP’s penetration and control of 
government and legislature and the existence of state-owned enterprises. Regretly, 
only three articles (Chan 2008: 97-8; Ye 2006; Cho 2001: 50 n1) indicate CCP cadres 
as actors of corruption in their definitions. Thus, setting the boundary of “public 
office” in China’s political and social context is critical in the conceptualization of 
Chinese corruption. 
Moreover, the specification of a corrupt behavior varies among scholars. 
Regarding the criterion to determine the boundary of corrupt behaviors, 6 studies use 
legality, 10 studies use legality and formal institutional rules and regulations, and the 
rest 8 definitions employ a even broader standard - (formal and informal) norms or 
administrative responsibilities. In China, the CCP and Chinese government, mass 
media and the public frequently blame gambling, whoring, or real estate market 
speculation as corruption, which are considered as unethical problems rather than 
corruption in other countries. Nevertheless, the existing definitions they reviewed do 
not reflect such a uniqueness of boundary setting in China. Hence, the definition of 
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Chinese corruption needs to reflect how corrupt behavior is understood in Chinese 
context. 
Based on the review, the thesis adopts a formal-legal definition of corruption 
in the Chinese context, which is as follows: 
“Publically unacceptable misbehavior committed by state functionaries for 
private gains at the expense of public interests or causing intentional and 
unintentional damage to public interests and values” (Ko and Weng 2009a). 
(II) Bribery 
Bribery is the most common type of corruption. Lambsdorff defines bribery as 
“obtaining of money or favors by public decision makers (politicians or bureaucrats) 
in return for preferential treatment or government services.” Bribery normally 
involves two parties, where a public official misuse his or her power to gain benefits 
from a private actor (Lambsdorf 2008). According to the Chinese Criminal Law, 
bribery means 
“any state functionary who, by taking advantage of his office, asks for other persons' 
property, or illegally accepts other persons' property and secures advantages for 
them… or in his economic activities, in violation of state's stipulations, accepts 
commissions and service charges offered in various names for their own 
possession… or any state organ, state-owned company or enterprise, institution or 
people's organization which, in its economic activities, accepts secretly rebates or 
commissions in various names without entering into its account…or any state 
functionary who, by taking advantage of his favorable conditions of his office or 
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status, seeks unlawful profits for the entruster through the acts of office of another 
state functionary, and extorts or accepts the entruster's property”(Criminal Law 1997 
Article 385-388). 
Since bribery involves illegitimate transaction between public officials and 
private actors, comparing to the definition of corruption, the actors of bribery should 
not only include state functionaries but also any other actors who give bribes to the 
state functionaries. However, the legal definition of bribery cited above actually is the 
definition of bribe-taking. Although bribe-giving can also be a crime according to the 
1997 Chinese Criminal Law, in practice, the crime of bribery is usually limited to the 
behavior of bribe-taking by individual state functionaries or organizations. This is 
reflected in the statistics of bribery by the procuratorates (see the annual report of the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate for example). Only a small proportion of official 
statistics of bribery is bribe-taking. Furthermore, state functionaries will be most 
blamed by the Chinese society if they involve in bribery. It is probably because that 
people usually have high expectation on state functionaries and if they violate their 
responsibility and commit bribery, the criticism will be very fierce. Thus, in this study, 
the definition of bribery mainly means state functionary’s bribe-taking behavior. 
As have discussed in the introduction chapter, compared to other types of 
corruption such as embezzlement and misappropriation, bribery has more political 
relevance because it involves interaction between officials and ordinary citizens. The 
public are most exposed and thus sensitive to bribery in their everyday life. In fact, 
many international surveys of corruption actually measure bribery rather than 
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corruption in a broad sense (Ko and Weng 2009a). Since bribery is the major 
transaction type of corruption, major explanations of corruption can be applied to 
explore the causes of bribery. 
II. Causes of bribery in China 
In this session I review twenty-one studies in English and twenty-five studies 
in Chinese on the causes of bribery in China. To avoid the arbitrary selection of 
journal, I accessed the database of China Journal Net (中国期刊网 zhongguo qikan 
wang) and compiled twenty-five Chinese written articles from the journals from 2001 
to 2009. The English literature includes five books and sixteen articles from 
commonly cited edited books on corruption and authoritative journals from 1990 to 
2009, mainly searched through JSTOR and The Web of Science. 
Major causes of bribery proposed by the reviewed literature can be divided 
into internal factors that involve the government per se and external factors that relate 
to the interactions between the government and private parties. Internal factors 
include low salaries, inefficiency of anti-bribery policies and failure of policy 
implementation. Effectiveness of implementation is affected by horizontal and 
vertical supervision. Horizontal factor is lack of independence of juridical agencies, 
while vertical factor relates to central-local relations, which is one effect of 
decentralization. External factors include government’s exposure and control over the 
market, the effects of premarket reforms such as privatization and outsourcing, and 
globalization. Table 1 presents the major causes of bribery in China proposed in 
current literature. 
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Table 1. Causes of bribery in China proposed in current literature 
Causes 
(general) 









7 (White 1996; He 
2000; Manion 2004; 
Gu 2001; Wei 2001; 
Zhou 2001; Shen 
and Gao 2005) 
Inefficiency of anti-bribery policy 
 
2 (Yan 2006; Manion 
2004: 145-9) 
Implementation 
failure due to lack of 
supervision 
Lack of independence 
of juridical agencies 
9 (He 2000; Zou 2000; 
Sapio 2005; Manion 
2004; Zhang 2001; 
Yao 2002; Yan 
2006; He 2004; Lu 
2000) 
Central-local relations 30 (Gong 1994: 121-9; 
He 2000; Hao and 
Johnston 1995: 85-6; 
White 1996: 156-7; 
Kwong 1997: 122-8; 
Sun 1999: 4; He 
2004: 242-7; Sun 
2004; Manion 2004: 
93-6; Wang 2005: 
1-2; Gong 2006: 
86-98; Yang 2005; 
Yan 2006; Guo 
2008: 362-3; Ren 
and Du 2008; Sapio 
2005; Wei 2001; 
Zhou 2001; Yan 
2004; Yu 2004; 
Shen and Gao 2005; 
Wang 2006; Yang 
2006; Chen 2007; 
Chen 2008; Ding 
2008; Xiao 2008; 
Zhao 2009; Lu 2006; 
Gu 2001; Zhang 
2005) 









Kwong 1997; Sun 
1999; Guo 2008; 
Ngo 2008; Hu 2001; 
Wu 2002; Zhu 2004; 
Shen and Gao 2005; 
Zhang 2005; Lu 
2006; Wang 2006; 
Ding 2008; Xiao 
2008; Zhang 2009; 
Fan 2000) 
Premarket reforms (privatization, outsourcing, 
partnership, etc.) 
3 (Manion 2004; Sun 
2004; Guo 2008) 
Globalization  2 (He 2000; Guo 
2008) 
* Number of studies that propose each cause 
 
Low salaries of civil servants have been criticized as a cause of rampant 
corruption in developing countries (e.g. Quah (2005)). White (1996), He (2000), and 
Manion (2004) all argue that due to the economic liberalization the incomes of the 
new private business classes have increased dramatically, while public officials enjoy 
only relatively small increase of salaries. The increase of civil servants’ salaries lags 
behind the rapid growth of living cost in the past decade. Moreover, the income gap 
between different departments within the government is significant. Officials in 
departments that control critical resources such as land, water, natural resources and 
business approval power enjoy higher salaries than those in departments that are less 
important to economic development (Shen & Gao 2005). This raised a sense of 
relative deprivation among the officials and it in turn creates incentives for these 
low-salary officials to pursuit personal gains through bribery as compensation. 
However, the argument that low salaries of public officials leads to the surge 
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of bribery in China is untenable for several reasons. First, public officials in China 
enjoy lots of allowance in housing, medical care, etc. besides salaries. As the prices of 
housing and medical care are high and they constitute a large proportion of 
household’s expenditure, public officials actually have compensation of their low 
salaries in this regard. Lu (2006) cites Zhou’s (1997) statistics to show that the real 
incomes of public officials are not low at all. According to Zhou (1997: 51), in 1995, 
the estimated total amount of money spent on public officials accounted for almost 
20% of the GDP that year. Thus, while public officials may have low salaries, their 
real income is not low compared to employees in other sectors. Second, as He (2004: 
343-4) argues, employees of party-state organizations have high political and social 
status. Third, public officials enjoy comfortable working environment, fixed working 
hours, and stable and secure career expectation. In accordance with secured career, 
public officials’ income is less affected by economic fluctuation than their 
counterparts in other sectors. Last but not least, party-state departments that have 
control over critical resources are places where bribery prevails, although officials in 
these departments have higher salaries than their counterparts in other departments. 
Thus, it is not low salaries but lack of power supervision that leads to bribery.  
Inefficiency of anti-bribery policies is another factor that contributes to the 
surge of bribery in Chins. Anti-bribery policies in China can be divided into two types: 
regulations designed and published by the Chinese and government and CCP, and 
laws. Yan (2006) argues that government and CCP anti-bribery regulations are 
oriented to “specific interest” and that CCP can decide which type of anti-bribery 
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policies to use according to its need. While Yan (2006) discusses the weakness of the 
design of government and CCP regulations, Manion (1998; 2004: 145-9) reveals the 
problem of the 1997 Chinese Criminal Law, which is one of the most important 
anti-bribery policy in China. By comparing the articles in the criminal law about 
embezzlement and bribery and private theft and swindling, Manion argues that the 
criminal law is more tolerant to embezzlement and bribery than private theft and 
swindling in the sense of minimum, maximum, and supplementary punishments for 
these crimes. The author explains that the Chinese government and CCP consider 
embezzlement and bribery less serious than private theft and swindling (2004: 148). 
According to Manion, the leniency of the criminal law thus implicitly encourages 
officials to commit bribery.  . 
However, counterarguments of the weaknesses of anti-bribery policy design 
exist. Different from Manion’s argument that the criminal law is lenient to bribery, 
many scholars emphasize the heavy punishment of crime of bribery in China (Zou 
2000; Zhang 2001). Moreover, some scholars find evidence of high standard for 
public officials in various anti-bribery laws and regulations. Ko and Weng (2009a) 
reviewed the code of ethics from CCP’s disciplinary regulations and the government’s 
administrative regulations and found out a high standard of conduct of the state and 
party officials. This high standard of conduct is in accordance to the Chinese 
traditional social norm that public officials should not only have high working 
capability but also high standard of moral trait. After examining 250 anti-corruption 
laws and regulations since 1980, Sapio (2005) claims that every single aspect of both 
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the private and public lives of state and party officials has been regulated by 
anti-bribery policies, including regulations and laws. More importantly, according to 
Sapio, under the current legal framework, even the most “creative, weird or unusual” 
manifestation of bribery could be punished. According to Zou (2000), Cho (2001), 
and Sapio (2005), the anti-bribery policy per se is comprehensive and unbiased, which 
is different from Yan’s (2006) and Manion’s (1998; 2004) arguments. 
Comparing to the design of anti-bribery policy, scholars have more consistent 
views on the implementation problems of those policies: failing to fully implement 
anti-bribery policies leads to widespread bribery in China. Indeed, implementation 
problems in China are not new. Almost every policy in China encountered 
implementation problems due to the difficulties in departmental coordination, 
conflicting demands of “an entire galaxy of superiors”, and the limited capacity of 
central oversight of policy implementation (Lampton 1987: 14-9). Anti-bribery 
policies are no exception. According to current literature, the implementation failure 
of anti-bribery policies is due to lack of power supervision horizontally and vertically, 
as shown in Table 1.  
Horizontally, CCP’s power is unrestricted and there is no independent and 
professional judicial agency to check and supervision the party. Some scholars hold 
that with the absolute power of CCP, anti-bribery policies, no matter how well they 
were designed, are deemed to fail (Yan 2006; Yao 2002; Zou 2000; He 2004). 
According to Yan (2006), CCP is the institution that should be under great monitoring 
because most corrupt officials are CCP members. However, given CCP’s permeation 
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in and control of all government organs and judicial system, it is impossible to 
effectively supervise it. Since there is no effective check and balance mechanism, 
abundant opportunities for the CCP officials to commit bribery exist. However, these 
arguments about the unrestricted power of CCP, though valid to some extent, do not 
take into account inner-party supervision, which the CCP leadership has paid much 
attention to and have made some progress on it in recent years. 
Another argument related to horizontal supervision is lack of professional and 
efficient anti-bribery agency due to limited resources, poor-qualified staffs, and 
coordination problems. As He (2000) states it, lack of technology and experience of 
anti-corruption agencies to detect new forms of bribery is one factor that accounts for 
the spreading bribery. Zou (2000) argues that the judges are poorly trained and thus 
have a limited understanding of laws and might misuse their power. Many scholars 
agree that anti-bribery policies are implemented selectively because the anti-bribery 
agencies themselves are corrupt (Ma 2008; Sapio 2005; Zou 2000). Difficulties of 
coordination between different anti-bribery agencies also hinder the implementation 
of anti-bribery policy. In China, there are four major anti-bribery agencies: people’s 
courts, people’s procuratorates, Ministry of supervision, and commissions of 
disciplinary inspection of CCP. However, in reality, besides these major agencies, 
many state organs such as State Council, the people’s congresses and the 
political-consultative conferences, and the audit offices are also involved in 
anti-bribery work. As Sapio (2005) states it, considering the central-level party and 
state apparatus only, the power of enforcing anti-bribery policies is disjointed and 
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dispersed horizontally between more than five agencies. The number is much larger if 
we consider the local level. Each anti-bribery organ need to interact with its horizontal 
and vertical counterparts in the implementation process for necessary information, 
expertise or resources (Sapio 2005). Scholars agree that in practice, poor coordination 
among these agencies is the main problem hindering the implantation of anti-bribery 
policies and thus leading to the growth of bribery (Zou 2000; Sapio 2005; Manion 
2004). However, since 2002, all judges, procurators, lawyers in China were required 
to pass the national judicial examinations. As a result, the professionalism of staffs in 
anti-bribery agencies is expected to improve. As this study aims at examining the 
trend of bribery over the past decade, the development of anti-bribery agencies in the 
same period needs to be examined.  
Vertically, fiscal and administrative decentralization have largely weakened 
the top-down disciplinary restraints of local governments (Wang 2005; He 2004). As 
an effect of decentralization, the central government has given local governments 
more discretionary power in the decision making and policy implementation process 
(Gong 2006; He 2004; Sun 1999; Kwong 1997; White 1996). The inefficient 
monitoring mechanism has provided incentives for officials to commit corruption 
(Kwong 1997). What is even worse is that decentralization increased the difficulties in 
anti-corruption activities (White 1996; Manion 2004). With the discretionary power of 
decision making at the local level, local government and party agencies always 
formulate local norms and regulations as their interpretation of central norms and 
regulations. In reality, anti-bribery work at localities follows detailed local norms 
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rather than general central norms and regulations (Sapio 2005). On the surface, these 
local regulations and norms are consistent with central regulations and norms. 
However, a further examination of such local policies reveals that they may bypass 
central legislation. Thus, some local legislation will distort the implementation of 
central anti-bribery policies.  
Conflict of anti-bribery work and economic development is the other factor 
that contributes to the distortion of policy implementation at the local level. Bribery is 
implicitly viewed by local officials as a necessary evil to impulse economic 
development (White 1996; Yan 2006). Anti-bribery work is thus perceived by the 
local government and party agencies as incompatible with local economic 
development (White 1996; Gong 2006). Such perception of anti-bribery work and the 
priority of economic development set by the local government distort the 
implementation of anti-bribery policies in practice (Sapio 2005; Sun 2008). As 
anti-bribery policies are conceived as an impediment of local economic interest, they 
will not be fully implemented. 
Even though there is such a high consensus on the relationship between 
central-local relations and bribery, counterarguments exist. Huang (1995) argues that 
the central government’s monitoring capacity over its local agencies has not 
weakened after decentralization. According to Sun (2004), in the period of 1978-1992, 
when decentralization took place, bribery soared up due to the increasing 
discretionary power the local governments enjoy. However, after 1992, the process of 
decentralization has been done, but bribery cases still keep increasing. Therefore, 
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there must be some other factors that explain the trend of bribery in the post-1992 era. 
Besides inner government factors, the increasing interactions between the 
government/CCP and private parties are also suggested in the literature as contributor 
to the exacerbation of bribery in China during the past decade. Two major factors 
contribute to the government/CCP’s increasing market exposure. One is rent-seeking. 
Due to the process of marketization and administrative decentralization, public 
officials have larger exposure to the market and thus have more interactions with the 
newly-emerged private classes. With the effect of decentralization and marketization, 
strict and regular central control was replaced by random intervention of local 
governments. The resulting co-existence of market forces and random government 
intervention generates abundant opportunities for corruption (He 2004). Party-state 
organizations still penetrate all levels of the countries and enjoy monopolistic power 
over local economy (He 2004: 343-4). In the mean time, according to Sun (2004) and 
Yan (2006), economic development has widened the scope of cadres’ power over new 
resources such as land, capital goods, personnel, business licensing, imports and 
exports, contract bidding, and so on.  
In addition of widening the scope for public officials to take bribes, economic 
development has also brought about increasing demand from new rising economic 
classes, which in turn contributes to the exacerbation of bribery. White (1996) argues 
that market economic reform has created new economic classes based on the 
combination of officialdom and business. These rising classes have increasing 
demand on corrupt exchange with officials for their benefits. Kwong (1997) also 
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argues that the grass roots now have more wealth and thus more willing to bribe the 
officials. While He (2000) argues that this is because the new economic forces lack 
commercial ethics, Sun (1999) holds that it is because of their lack of access to 
various resources and a motivation to get over unfair competition. Guo (2008) holds a 
different view, suggesting that new entrepreneurs bribe the officials from the 
motivation of getting protection and priorities in the competition. 
As Ngo (2008) concludes, government regulations on price and market entry 
generate rents which the business organizations try to gain, mostly though bribing. 
Government agencies that have power over rents are likely to accept bribes given by 
the businesses. Moreover, the government agencies and economic actors that benefit 
from this corrupt exchange will try to maintain their privileges by creating more rents 
and thus result in the increase of corruption. In fact, rent-seeking per se is not a root 
cause of bribery. Instead, it is the monopolistic power of government that causes 
bribery. Many Chinese scholars who adopt rent-seeking theory to explain corruption 
in China suggest that the effective way to decrease bribery is reducing government’s 
monopolistic power over the market through furthering the process of marketization 
(Wu 2002; Hu 2001). 
Associated with rent seeking are pre-market reforms including privatization of 
state-owned enterprises, outsourcing and partnership in public investment and 
construction programs. As Rose-Ackerman (1999) argues, privatization process of 
state-owned enterprises is often fraught with bribery because the client can win the 
bidding of the state-owned assets in the competition at a low price through bribing 
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officials in charge. The process of state-owned enterprise reform in China is indeed 
fraught with corruption. However, the main forms of corruption in China’s 
state-owned enterprise reform are not bribery but embezzlement and misappropriation 
(Sun 2004; Manion 2004). This is because in China the manager will get the asset for 
themselves or to their relatives (Manion 2004: 107-10). Hence, privatization is not 
relevant in this study. Compared to privatization, outsourcing and partnership are the 
kinds of pre-market reform that lead to the growth of bribery. Developmental 
programs run by both central and local governments often create large opportunities 
for bribery because constructors and developers will try to bribe officials in charge of 
the programs to get the projects (Sun 2004). Since most public investment programs 
are conducted in forms of outsourcing and partnership that are one of the main causes 
of bribery, it needs further examination in this study. 
He (2000) and Guo (2008) view globalization as one cause of bribery in China. 
According to He (2000), globalization provides more opportunities of bribery since 
the government have the power to allocate licensing, collect taxes and customs, make 
decision on import and export, etc. What is more important is that globalization 
makes the corrupt officials transit their illegal properties to foreign countries more 
easily and at the same time make the detection more difficult. Due to the lack of 
access to reliable data, the impact of globalization on the increase of bribery in China 
will not be tested in this study.  
In conclusion, the review of causes of bribery both in English and Chinese 
literature has several implications for this thesis. First, current literature seldom 
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discusses the trend of bribery in China over time. While the studies of some scholars 
(Manion 2004 and Sun 2004 for example) claim that bribery has unique 
characteristics and more public relevance and sensitiveness compared to other forms 
of corruption such as embezzlement and misappropriation, many scholars do not 
examine whether bribery possesses a different pattern from other forms of corruption 
over years (Wedeman 2008; Wederman 2004; Wedeman 2005; Guo 2008). As 
different types of corruption have different characteristics and have different policy 
implications, it is important to examine and discuss how the trend of specific kinds of 
corruption has evolved and what factors contribute to such changes so as to curb 
different forms of corruption. To fill in this gap, this study aims to examine the trend 
of bribery over time and compare it to other forms of corruption. 
Second, while the argument that low salaries of public officials contribute to 
rampant bribery in China is not valid, the problem of anti-bribery measures is the 
inner-government and party factor that affects the trend of bribery. Anti-bribery 
measures consist of two parts: policies per se and the implementation of such policies. 
In the reviewed literature, there is still debate on whether the anti-bribery policy 
design is problematic or not, while most literature agrees that the problem of weak 
implementation of such policies is a major cause of rampant bribery in China. Both 
English and Chinese studies criticize the implementation problems of anti-bribery 
policies. However, as the literature only focuses on static horizontal and vertical 
power distribution, it fails to explain why bribery keep increasing after the process of 
power redistribution has completed. Since this research focuses on the trend of 
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bribery over time, the changes of the important factors that contribute to 
implementation failure will be examined. 
Third, alongside with internal factors, external factors that involve the 
interactions between government/CCP and private parties also contribute to the surge 
of bribery. External factors include greater market exposure of public officials, 
premarket reforms such as privatization, outsourcing and partnership, and 
globalization. While the process of decentralization has accomplished in 1992 and the 
local government’s discretionary power to the central government remains relatively 
constant after that (Sun 2004), the economic development provides more 
opportunities for bribery given the government’s control over scarce resources. 
Greater market exposure leads to public officials’ rent seeking behaviors and bribery 
soared up as a result. Since privatization mostly leads to embezzlement and 
misappropriation rather than bribery, it is not relevant in this study. On the other hand, 
outsourcing and partnership in many public investment programs are major sources of 
bribery and thus would be examined. Due to lack of solid data, the impact of 
globalization will not be tested in this thesis.  
Many scholars agree that government programs and real estate development 
are among the most serious areas of bribery (Sun 2004; Manion 2004; Guo 2008). 
The development of real estate reflects government’s control over land and 
administrative approval power, and thus serves as an indicator of government’s 
exposure to the markets. Public investment programs reveal the impact of pre-market 
reforms such as outsourcing and partnership on bribery. However, in current literature, 
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there is no empirical test of whether these possible external factors really affect the 
trend of bribery over time and to what extent. Due to the lack of data, most studies 
rely on logical reasoning. Some Chinese literature even proposes possible causes 
without giving any explanation. Thus, this thesis tries to conduct a preliminary 


















Chapter 3 Research Questions and Framework of Analysis 
The literature review in the former chapter has several implications for this 
thesis. First, a trend of the level of bribery awaits more empirical studies as most 
studies discuss the aggregated corruption trend rather than distinguish bribery from 
other types of corruption. Second, there is still a debate on whether the weakness of 
anti-corruption measures lies in inefficient anti-corruption policies per se or the 
failure to fully implement these policies, or both. Third, external factors including rent 
seeking and pre-market reforms (e.g. outsourcing and partnership) are suggested by 
current literature as possible causes of bribery in China. However, there is no 
empirical test of whether and to what extent these possible external factors affect the 
trend of bribery over time. 
My preliminary study in this thesis aims to fill in the above-mentioned gaps 
and debates in current literature by focusing on the problem of bribery in China. To 
this end, this thesis proposes two research questions as follows: 
 
1. Has bribery worsened in China? 
2. If so, what are the main causes of the worsening of bribery in China? 
 
To answer the first question, the filed cases of bribery by procuratorates will 
be examined as to reflect the trend of actual bribery. Some scholars argue that due to 
the ‘‘hiddenness gap’’ between actual and detected cases (Guo 2008), the official 
statistics reflect more about judicial and disciplinary efficiencies than actual 
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corruption frequencies (Andvig et al. 2001: 24). As bribery involves at least two 
parties and often takes place covertly with various forms, it is one of the most difficult 
types of corruption to detect. Thus, some may argue that the increasing number of 
reported cases reflects the improvement of the procuratorate’s experience and 
technique to detect bribery.6 To examine this counterargument, how most major cases 
were revealed will be discussed as an indicator of the efficiency of the procuratorates. 
Moreover, if the increasing reported bribery cases are purely due to the improvement 
of investigation, we can expect the same increasing pattern of other types of 
corruption, which will be discussed in the following section. 
In addition, the change of number of reported cases could be affected by 
change of laws and rules or political emphasis rather than that of actual corruption 
number. However, since this thesis focuses on bribery after 1998, when the Chinese 
Criminal Law was systemically modified, the change of laws cannot explain the 
increase of reported bribery cases afterwards. What is even worse is that many 
scholars are skeptical about the reliability of the official statistics. Political influence 
and procurators’ discretion power are possible factors that may affect the reliability of 
the statistics. Because of these possible weaknesses of official statistics, we need to 
assess whether the increased bribery reported cases reflects the increase of actual 
number of bribery. 
To answer the second research question, according to the literature review, a 
framework of analysis is established for this study (see Figure 1). Based on this 
                                                        
6 http://CCP.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64099/4821321.html 
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framework, I establish four hypotheses to test the internal institutional factors and 
external environmental factors. Different research methods will be applied to examine 
each hypothesis as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Framework of analysis 
 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the exacerbation of bribery in China over the past decade 
is mainly due to internal institutional factors, which include inefficiency of policy 
design and implementation failure, and external factors, namely, the increasing 
interactions between government/CCP and private parties. Lack of both horizontal 
and vertical supervision of power contributes to the failure in implementing 
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anti-bribery policies. Pre-market reforms such as outsourcing and partnership, and 
rent seeking in the situation of greater market exposure of public officials contribute 
to the external environmental factors that affect the trend of bribery over time. 
Qualitative and quantitative method will be applied to examine internal and external 
factors, respectively. Based on this framework, the first two hypotheses will test the 
internal factors whereas the third and fourth hypotheses will test the external ones.  
Hypothesis 1: Incomprehensiveness and lenient anti-bribery policies worsens 
bribery. 
This hypothesis tests one of the internal institutional factors that affect the 
trend of bribery in China during the last decade – anti-bribery policies. As discussed 
in the literature review, there is a contention among scholars on whether China’s 
anti-bribery policies are not comprehensive and poorly designed and thus contributes 
to the rise of corruption (Yan 2006; Manion 1998). In China, anti-bribery policies 
include laws and government/party regulations. The 1997 Chinese Criminal Law is 
one of the most important anti-bribery policies. However, according to Manion (1998; 
2004: 145-9), the criminal law is more lenient towards embezzlement and bribery 
than private theft and swindling in terms of minimum, maximum, and supplementary 
punishments for these crimes. Yan (2006) points out that government and CCP 
anti-bribery regulations are oriented to “specific interest”.  
On the other hand, many scholars argue that standards for public officials in 
various anti-bribery laws and regulations are high, and the punishment of bribery is 
harsh (Zou 2000; Zhang 2001). Sapio (2005) further claims that China’s anti-bribery 
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policies have covered every single aspect of both the private and public lives of state 
and party officials, and the anti-bribery policy design is comprehensive and unbiased. 
This hypothesis will review major anti-bribery policies in contemporary China to 
examine whether the policies are not comprehensive and poorly designed and thus 
leads to the worsening of bribery. 
Hypothesis 2: Failing to implement anti-bribery policies effectively results in 
worsening bribery trend. 
The other important internal institutional factors that may shape the trend of 
bribery over time – implementation of anti-bribery policies – will be tested by this 
hypothesis. Many Chinese scholars argue that the weaknesses of anti-corruption 
policy implementation contribute to the failure of corruption control (Lu 2006; Xiao 
2008) instead of criticizing insufficient or poorly designed anti-corruption policies. 
The Secretary of the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI) of the 
CCP Wei Jianxing also criticizes the implementation problems in local areas (Wei 
2001). Indeed, almost every policy in China encountered implementation problems 
due to the problems of power structure. Anti-bribery policies are no exception. Lack 
of horizontal check and balance and lack of vertical supervision lead to the failure of 
effective implementation of anti-bribery policies. Professional and independent 
anti-bribery agencies are critical for horizontal supervision of power. Vertically, the 
oversight power of central government on local governments affects the 
implementation of anti-bribery policies.  
This hypothesis will examine whether there are changes in regard of 
 36
horizontal and vertical power constraints during the past decade and whether such 
changes contribute to shape the trend of bribery in the same period. 
Hypothesis 3: Greater market exposure of government through rent seeking (in 
the area of real estate) leads to more bribery. 
This hypothesis examines the impact of greater market exposure, one of the 
external environmental factors that may shape the trend of bribery in the past decade. 
Many scholars argue that economic development can lead to the growth of bribery 
due to government’s greater exposure to market with power and control over a variety 
of scarce resources such as land. The development of real estate reflects government’s 
control over land and administrative approval power, and thus serves as an indicator 
of government’s exposure to the market. Real estate investment is one of the areas 
where bribery is most serious (Manion 2004). Private individuals or firms have high 
incentives to offer bribes to officials concerned to get the approval of using land 
(Rose-Ackerman 1999). Many high-level officials investigated in recent years were 
involved in bribery in this field. For example, former deputy Mayor of Beijing, Liu 
Zhihua, was sentenced to death because he accepted seven million RMB bribes from 
real estate developers (Cai 2008). Another striking example is that, within one year, 
eight provincial-department-level officials in Chongqing were investigated due to 
accepting bribes from real estate developers.7 The relation between bribery and the 
amount of real estate investment, which reflects the relation between greater market 
exposure and bribery, will thus be tested in this hypothesis.  
                                                        
7 http://www.ycwb.com/news/2008-10/28/content_1998360.htm 
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Hypothesis 4: Pre-market reforms such as outsourcing and partnership (in 
public investment programs and procurement) contribute to the increase of bribery. 
Pre-market reform including outsourcing and partnership is the other 
important external factor that affects the level of bribery over time. Susan 
Rose-Ackerman (1999: 27) argues that major government projects and programs 
create substantial incentives for private firms, and they are “the preserve of large 
business and high-level officials.” It also applies to China. As Sun (2004: 60) points 
out, after 1992 when the “plan” part was taken out of the economy, outsourcing to and 
partnership with private sectors become the government’s main way of conducting 
public developmental programs and government procurement. Since then, 
competition for public investment projects and government procurement has become 
hotspots of bribery in China. Thus, with the increase of public investments and 
government procurement, bribery cases are expected to increase. 
As public investments, government procurements also generate incentives for 
private firms to bribe related officials to win contracts. Since 1996, both central and 
local government financial departments have established special agencies responsible 
for managing government procurement. In the central government, the Government 
Procurement Management Section in the Treasury Division of Ministry of Finance 
was founded. Some local governments established special agencies to conduct 
government procurement.8 In 2003, government procurement accounts for 1.4% of 
GDP and 6.7% of government expenditure in China.9 In 2008, the percentages only 




increased to 2% of GDP and 9.6% of government expenditure. 10  Government 
procurement in China is still limited to some special financial appropriation for 
buying equipments, cars, and other standardized products. Large projects such as 
constructions of government buildings are still not all included in government 
procurement. The process of government procurement is still lack of transparency and 
is still underdeveloped. There is no uniformed bidding management method, clear 
regulations on bidders, or sufficient number of specialists in the judging panel, etc.11 
Due to the immaturity and lack of standardization of government procurement process, 
some scholars argue that the increase of transactions in it is expected to increase 
bribery (Guo 2008).  
According to Guo (2008), who analyzes 594 corruption cases committed by 
officials at and above county level, public investment and procurement accounts for 
the highest percentage (26.4%) of officials above county level and below 
vice-provincial or vice-ministerial level who commit corruption and the second 
largest proportion (27.9%) for officials above vice-provincial and vice-ministerial 
level (Guo 2008: 363). It suggests that public investment and procurement is fraught 
with bribery and is the area that studies on bribery should not neglect. However, since 
Guo does not use random sampling in selecting corruption cases, his finding may 
have bias. Thus, further examination of the relationship between public investment 
and procurement and the trend of bribery is necessary. 
 




Chapter 4 Research Design and Method 
The period covered in this study is from 1998 to 2007. 1998 is to some extent 
a turning point of China’s anti-corruption work. The most significant illustration is the 
modification of criminal law. The Chinese Criminal Law (CCL), firstly enacted in 
1979, is a primary guideline for anti-corruption work. The 1979 CCL only specified 
three types of corruption: embezzlement (article 155), bribery (article 185) and 
neglect of duty (article 187). However, corruption exacerbated overwhelmingly. In the 
1990s, combating the growing corruption became an urgent national agenda but legal 
grounds of anti-corruption effort were weak and the 1979 CCL was not enough to 
control burgeoning corruption. Consequently, the CCL was modified in 1997 in which 
the types of corruption are expanded to seven types and the amounts of money 
involved are increased. 
In addition, in 1998, the Chinese government launched an all-around 
administrative reform which aims at building an efficient, coordinated, and 
standardized government administrative management system, establishing a 
high-qualified professional team of administrative management, and perfecting the 
civil service system. Before 1998, the government has launched three administrative 
reforms, which are in 1982, 1988, and 1993 respectively. Compared to the previous 
three reforms and even the later reform in 2003, the 1998 administrative reform 
involved the widest range of aspects and was with the strongest momentum. Through 
this reform, the number of departments in the State Council was reduced from 40 to 
29. In addition, almost all industrial-special economic departments, which are the 
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organization foundation of the “government-enterprise syncretic system,” were 
abolished. Thus, this reform effort forms a new environment for anti-corruption work. 
The dependent variable of this study is bribery cases, which will be measured 
by procuratorate bribery data in the period of 1998-2007. Reliability and validity of 
the procuratorate data as a measurement of the trend of actual bribery cases over time 
will be discussed in the following chapter. Major independent variables are real estate 
investment, public investment and government procurement.  
Changes of provincial governors and party secretaries are dummy variables. 
Many scholars criticize the power over-concentration of provincial party secretaries 
(PPSs). While the central control has diminished as a result of decentralization, 
hierarchy is still very strong at the local level (Kwong 1997; Sun 2004; Ren and Du 
2008). With much reduced central control, the PPSs have power over all local affaires 
such as personnel issues, decisions on large public projects and the use of lands. 
Moreover, the party committee penetrates and surpasses congress and people’s 
political consultative conference at the same level. Thus, the power of the PPS has 
almost no limit (Ren and Du 2008). This power over-concentration has contributed to 
the rampant bribery in local China. Thus, the changes of these local 
“first-in-command” are included to test their impact on the level of bribery. 
For the dependent variable, national and provincial level procuratorate 
statistics of corruption will be used. Besides bribery data, prosecution statistics of 
other forms of corruption such as embezzlement and misappropriation will also be 
examined. The data is collected from the Chinese Law Yearbooks (1999-2008) and 
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provincial statistical yearbooks of 7 provinces (1999-2008). Besides the procuratorate 
statistics, documents of important conferences such as State Council Anti-corruption 
Conference and Party Congress of CCP since 1997 will be collected to measure 
political emphasis of anti-bribery work. Media reports will also be collected as 
supplementary data to elaborate the situation of bribery. 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 will be examined through qualitative method, while 
Hypothesis 3 and 4 will be tested using quantitative method, namely, regression 
models. To test Hypothesis 1, I collect and analyze a series of major anti-bribery 
policy documents since 1998. The policies covered in these documents are: laws, 
regulations published by the Central Committee of CCP and State Council, 
supplementary documents published by the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate and Public Security, and regulations by the CCDI and Ministry 
of Supervision. The coverage and complexity of the policies and the clarity in 
defining bribe behaviors and punishment will be examined. The sources of data are 
Pandect of Current Anti-Corruption Laws and Regulations (dangfeng lianzheng he 
fanfubai xianxing fagui zhidu quanshu) edited by the Central Commission for 
Disciplinary Inspection of CCP and Ministry of Supervision in 2005 and an online 
database “LawinfoChina”. 
For Hypothesis 2, the procedural approach is employed to gauge 
implementation failure. According to this approach, the standard to assess 
implementation success or failure is to examine whether “declarative policy was 
implemented efficiently and in ways consistent with the procedures called for in the 
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policy document” (Lampton 1987: 7). By this definition, if the procedures were not 
followed, there was implementation failure. Using this procedure approach to evaluate 
anti-bribery policy implementation, as discussed in the literature review, we can 
figure out various factors in horizontal and vertical power distribution contributing to 
implementation failure. To test whether the increase of bribery can be explained by 
the implementation problems, several variables will be examined, namely, the power 
structure of the party committee and anticorruption agencies, the duties and limits of 
major anti-corruption agencies, and the central government’s capacity to monitor local 
policy implementation. Since this thesis aims to explain the trend rather than the 
severity of bribery, the changes of these implementation contexts will be analyzed. 
Regarding Hypothesis 3 and 4, public investment is measured by capital 
construction investments by government and fixed asset investments by state-owned 
enterprises. Capital construction investment and real estate investment are two major 
types of fixed asset investment in China. There is no overlap between real estate 
investments and capital construction investments considering the sources of funds. 
While capital construction investment by government is funded by government 
budget, the sources of funds of real estate investments mainly comes from domestic 
loans, self-raising funds, and others such as bonds and individual money, which 
account for 21.9%, 28.7%, and 45.5% respectively. 12  Therefore, real estate 
investment and capital construction investment affect bribery from different aspects: 
the former mainly affects bribery activities in approval of land release for commercial 
                                                        
12 This is the average percentage in the period of 1997-2006. 
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construction, while the latter affects bribery activities in bidding contracts of major 
construction projects.  
Data of real estate investments, capital construction investments, and fixed 
asset investments by state-owned enterprises at both national and local levels are 
collected from Chinese Statistical Yearbooks (1999-2008). To test whether the growth 
in the amount of government procurement under the imperfect institutional design 
contributes to the worsening of bribery, government procurement at the national level 
will be included as an independent variable. Since statistics of government 
procurement at the local level are not available, it will not be included in the local 
level analysis. Data of government procurement at the national level is collected from 
the website of Chinese Government Procurement (http://www.ccgp.gov.cn/new/). 
Real values of these independent variables are used in this study instead of nominal 
values as reported in the statistical yearbooks. To state it differently, all the values of 
real estate investment, public investment and government procurement are adjusted 
according to the inflation rate of each year. In China, the inflation rate is reflected by 
the GRP Index. Since this research covers the period of 1998-2007, the basic year of 
GRP Index is 1998, that is, the GRP Index of 1998 is set as 100. A summary of 











































To test Hypothesis 3 and 4, the approach of time series pool data analysis with 
fixed effect (year as dummy variable) will be applied. Various models including 
different independent variables will be established and compared. In total, there are 
ten models with different combination of each independent variable at both the 
national and the local levels. Details of these ten models and their regression results 
are presented in the Appendix. National-level data are used in Model 1 to Model 7, 
while provincial-level data are applied in Model 8, 9 and 10. Model 1, 2 and 3 include 
one independent variable only, namely real estate investment, public investment, and 
government procurement respectively. The results show the relationship between each 
explanatory factor and bribery without controlling any other possible explanatory 
variables at the national level. Model 4, 5 and 6 includes two of the independent 
variables each, without controlling other variables. Model 7 includes all three 
independent variables. 
Model 8 examines the relationships between bribery and the three independent 
variables, i.e., real estate investment, public investment and government procurement. 
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GRP Index reflecting inflation rate is included as a control variable to test Quade’s 
(2007) argument that official corruption statistics is correlated to inflation rate. In her 
article, Quade found a correlation between official corruption data and inflation rate 
and claims that CCP’s four major anticorruption campaigns—in 1982, 1986, 1989 and 
1993—have been used primarily to combat economic overheating rather than 
corruption. Based on this finding, Quade concludes that CCP’s anti-corruption 
enforcement campaigns have been mainly an instrument used for reducing 
over-investment. To test whether Quade’s finding also applies to official bribery cases, 
inflation rate is included in all three provincial-level models (Model 8 to 10) as a 
control variable. As has mentioned above, the basic year of the GRP index used in this 
thesis is 1998, which is set as 100. The data is from the Chinese Statistical Yearbooks 
(1999-2008). 
In Model 8 to 10, changes of provincial party secretary and governor will be 
treated as dummy variables to test whether they have significant impact on bribery at 
the provincial level. Since bribery relies on personal connections (guanxi) to 
government officials, and since the local power is highly concentrated on the 
provincial party secretary (Tan 2004b; Ren and Du 2008), the change of provincial 
party secretary and governor may affect the number of bribery. 
While year is not controlled in Model 8, it is included as dummy variable in 
Model 9 and Model 10 to test whether variations of bribery between different years 
are significant. Province is not controlled in Model 9. However, since different 
provinces vary in size, population, level of economic development and even culture 
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and history, the regression result may be different if we control province in the model. 
Thus, to test the regional effect, Model 10 include province as dummy variable. 
One limitation of the data in this study is that only 7 province-level localities, 
including four directly governed city regions (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and 
Chongqing), and three provinces (Jilin, Anhui, Henan), publish prosecution corruption 
data in the statistical yearbooks. Thus, at provincial level, the sample size is small, 
which may bring about bias in the result. 
Another limitation is that official statistics in China may not be reliable. Many 
scholars are skeptical of the statistics provided by the Chinese government, especially 
the economic statistics. Even the Chinese government admitted that some local 
statistics are forged by the local statistical departments due to political pressure from 
their superiors or economic incentives. In some local areas, the statistics may not be 











Chapter 5 Has Bribery Worsened in China? 
This chapter aims at answer the first research question on the trend of actual 
bribery over the past decade. I use the filed cases of bribery reported by the 
procuratorates to measure the level of bribery. The Central Bureau of Anti-Corruption 
in the procuratorate is the major anti-bribery agency in China’s judiciary system since 
its establishment in 1989. Bribery cases involving more than 5,000 RMB should be 
dealt with by the procuratorates. The sources of procuratorate bribery cases accepted 
come from three channels: citizen allegation, cases transferred from the CCDI and 
Ministry of Supervision, and cases discovered by the procuratorate itself. Among 
these accepted cases, around 50 to 60 percent is filed by the procuratorate. Using this 
data, the trend of bribery is calculated through comparing the number in the starting 
year and the ending year, and indicators of the growth rate and regression coefficient 
of the filed bribery cases. To better illustrate the trend of bribery in the last decade, 
not only the total number of filed bribery cases but also the number of major bribery 
cases, number of public officials filed, and number of senior officials filed for bribery 
are examined. Trends of embezzlement and misappropriation are calculated in the 
same way to compare with the trend of bribery. The results of calculation are shown 




Table 3. Trend of bribery cases over time 
 1998 2007 Growth rate Regression 
Coefficient 
Bribery cases filed 8759 12226 39.6% 358.46 
Major bribery cases 1847 8045 335.6% 629.99 
Persons 9255 13191 42.5% 413.95 
Senior officials 909 1650 81.5% 76.982 
 
Table 4. Trend of embezzlement cases over time 
 1998 2007 Growth rate Regression 
Coefficient 
Embezzlement cases filed 12909 9956 -22.9% -548.32 
Major embezzlement cases 3657 5866 -60.4% 117.73 
Persons 15199 13529 -11.0% -424.55 
Senior officials 456 462 1.3% -4.897 
 
Table 5. Trend of misappropriation cases over time 
 1998 2007 Growth rate Regression 
Coefficient 
Misappropriation cases filed 8283 4285 -48.3% -645.28 
Major Misappropriation cases 3885 2908 -25.1% -233.27 
Persons 9056 4998 -44.8% -659.59 
Senior officials 289 196 -32.2% -26.309 
 
Table 3 to 5 show the structural changes of three major forms of corruption in 
China since 1998. From these tables we can see that total number of filed bribery 
cases, major bribery cases, total number of officials and senior officials committing 
bribery have significantly increased over years. In contrast, embezzlement and 
misappropriation cases show opposite trends, which have been decreasing since 1998. 
 49
Some scholars argue that due to the ‘‘hiddenness gap’’ between actual and 
detected cases, the official statistics reflect more about judicial and disciplinary 
efficiencies than actual corruption frequencies (Andvig et al. 2001: 24; Guo 2008). 
Since bribery involves at least two parties and often takes place covertly with various 
forms, it is one of the most difficult types of corruption to detect. Thus, some may 
argue that the increasing number of reported cases reflects the improvement of the 
procuratorate’s experience and technique to detect bribery. However, even though the 
detection level of procuratorate has been improved to some extent, it is still not 
effective enough because most major cases are discovered through other channels 
(Guo 2008).13 Moreover, if the increasing reported bribery cases are purely due to the 
improvement of investigation, we can expect the same increasing pattern of other 
types of corruption, which is not the case as shown in Table 4 and 5. 
Political factors such as anti-bribery campaigns, the central authority’s 
emphasis of curbing bribery may affect the number of reported cases, which is 
reflected by the dramatic increase of reported bribery cases in the same year. However, 
the political emphasis argument fails to explain the consistently increasing trend of 
bribery cases before the government’s emphasis. Although the CCP and Chinese 
government already enacted regulations on controlling commercial bribery in 1996, it 
is not until 2006 that commercial bribery gained significant political attention. Since 
the speech by Wen Jiabao at the Fourth Anti-corruption Conference of the State 
Council in the beginning of 2006, commercial bribery was set as the focal point of the 
                                                        
13 Gao Fusheng summarizes 25 incidences when corrupt officials were accidentally revealed. 
http://CCP.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64099/4821321.html 
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Chinese government’s anti-corruption efforts. However, before 2006, the official 
reported bribery cases have been increasing over years. 
Furthermore, if this political influence is so significant on the procuratorate’s 
reported bribery cases, one can expect a dramatic rise of bribery cases together with a 
sharp decrease of other types of corruption in 2006 and/or 2007. This is because that 
with given resources within one year, procuratorates’ particular emphasis on detecting 
bribery will lead to the decline of other corruption types investigated. However, the 
procuratorate statistics does not show any sharp decrease of embezzlement and 
misappropriation cases between 2005 and 2006. Thus, there is no evidence that the 
increasing number of official reported bribery cases is due to political influence. 
Another possible threat to the validity of official bribery statistics is the 
discretion of anti-corruption agencies. To examine whether this factor affects the 
validity of the data, we should first understand the process and mechanism of 
anti-corruption in China.14 At the central level, there are four major anti-corruption 
agencies in China: Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of CCP, 
Ministry of Supervision, Central Bureau of Anti-Corruption at the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate, and Supreme People’s Court. Figure 2 shows how the major 
anti-corruption agencies deal with corruption cases. 
Re-established and created in 1978 and 1986 separately, CCDI handled the 
party cadre’s disciplinary cases and the Ministry of Supervision dealt with 
misconducts of government officials. However, as most state cadres are also CCP 
                                                        
14 The following discussion of the process of anti-corruption in China is based on the study of Ko and Weng 
(2009). 
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members, CCDI and Ministry of Supervision had to handle overlapping cases. To 
avoid duplication of duties, the two agencies’ functions were merged in 1993. The 
sources of clues of CCDI and Ministry of Supervision mainly come from the citizens’ 
reports and the agencies’ own investigation. Citizens’ reports constitute the majority 
of accepted cases that CCDI and Ministry of Supervision deal with (Sapio 2005: 21). 
After accepting the cases, the agencies will conduct investigation and if there is 
evidence of misbehavior, the cases will be filed and further investigated. 
Serious cases, i.e., involving more than 5,000 RMB, are sent to the Central 
Bureau of Anti-Corruption which was established within the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate in 1989. Thus, the sources of procuratorate cases accepted come from 
three channels: the reports of the citizens, cases transferred from the CCDI and 
Ministry of Supervision, and cases discovered by the procuratorate. After 
investigation of filed cases, the procuratorate transfer the cases with sufficient 
evidence to the court to prosecute and sentence corrupt officials. 
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Figure 2. Official process of corruption investigation and detection 
 




The increasing number of filed bribery cases is not because of the 
discretionary power of the procurators, but because of the increase of actual number 
of bribery cases. It is because that during the process of prosecution, there is little 
room for discretion between the accepted cases and the filed cases. The discretionary 
power of the procurators may be more significant in the selection of cases to suit. 
According to the Supreme Procuratorate, in the period of 2003-2008, 80% of cases 
clues are from the public.15 From 1988 to 2007, on average, less than 25% of the 
procuratorate filed bribery cases are from the disciplinary data and around 75% are 
from the report of the citizens. Although there is a gap between the accepted cases and 
filed cases, an examination of the provincial data shows that the trend of filed cases 
parallels that of accepted cases, which demonstrates that the increase of filed cases 
reflects the increasing trend of actual bribery cases. 
Even though we confirm that the increased number of filed bribery cases 
reflects the actual trend of bribery, one counterargument exists: the increase of bribery 
is simply because that there are more public officials who have the discretion power 
to take bribes. This argument can be rejected if we compare the trend of number of 
public officials with bribery cases. As Table 6 shows, the growth rate and coefficient 
of bribery cases and persons filed are much larger than those of public officials from 
1998 to 2007. Thus, the counterargument that the rise of bribery is simply because of 
the increased number of public officials is rejected. It in turn strengthens the argument 
                                                        
15 http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/101380/9558519.html 
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that the situation of bribery has been worsened. 
Table 6. Trend of bribery cases and number of public officials over time 
 1998 2007 Growth rate Regression 
Coefficient
Bribery cases filed 8759 12226 39.6% 358.46 
Persons filed 9255 13191 42.5% 413.95 
Public officials 10,970,000 12,912,122 17.7% 24.05 
 
To conclude, the examination of procuratorate statistics shows that the 
situation of bribery has worsened by 39.6% in the period of 1998-2007. The following 
question would be: what are the possible explanations of such an increasing trend of 
bribery? The following two chapters will try to answer this question by analyzing 











Chapter 6 Anti-bribery Policy Design and Bribery 
According to the literature review, the weakness of anti-bribery policy design 
is an important possible internal factor to explain the rise of bribery. There is still a 
debate in current literature on whether the growth of bribery in China is due to the 
problems of anti-bribery policy planning. To fill in the knowledge gap and find out 
explanations of the increase of bribery from 1998 to 2007, this section will review the 
comprehensiveness of anti-bribery policies and investigate whether these policies are 
biased. 
Some scholars claim that anti-bribery policies in China are designed to serve 
“specific interest” and are thus incomprehensive and biased (Yan 2006). However, a 
review of the Chinese anti-bribery policies suggests that China has established a 
comprehensive set of anti-bribery policies to combat different forms of bribery. At the 
central level, there are around 1100 rules and regulations on corruption. Only in the 
period of 2002-2007, the CCDI and Ministry of Supervision have established and 
revised over 160 rules and regulations alone and enacted another 40 with other 
agencies concerned. The number of rules and regulations at the local level is even 
larger. For example, in the same period from 2002 to 2007, more than 1000 local 
regulations have been enacted.16 To further test this argument, a series of current 
major anti-bribery policies at the central level will be reviewed. These policies include: 
laws, regulations published by the Central Committee of CCP and State Council, 
supplementary documents published by the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme 
                                                        
16 http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-10-17/193514108076.shtml 
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People’s Procuratorate and Public Security, and regulations by the CCDI and Ministry 
of Supervision. 
Table 6 shows the number of anti-bribery policies published in the period of 
1998-2007. Till 2007, 542 anti-bribery policies have been published and enacted. 
These policies cover areas where bribery takes place most frequently, which includes 
government procurement, contracting of public program, cadre personnel, releasing of 
land and administrative approval power. The responsibilities of anti-bribery agencies 
and the coordination between different agencies to tackle bribery are clearly stated in 
the policies. Different forms of bribery are regulated. While the accumulative number 
reflects the comprehensiveness of anti-bribery policies, the newly published 
anti-bribery policies in a given year serves as an indicator of the degree of attention 
paid by CCP and the government to combating bribery. As Table 7 presents, in the 
period of 2000-2003, over forty new policies were published every year. In the year of 
2003, fifty-five new policies were published, showing CCP and the government’s 
emphasis on tackling bribery. Thus, current anti-bribery policies are comprehensive in 
the sense of tackling bribery in different areas, clarifying the coordination of different 






Table 7. Number of anti-bribery policies published from 1998 to 2007 
Year Number of new anti-bribery 
policies published 
Accumulative number of 
anti-bribery policies  
1998 26 249 
1999 23 272 
2000 42 314 
2001 43 357 
2002 41 398 
2003 55 453 
2004 38 491 
2005 24 515 
2006 12 527 
2007 15 542 
Note: Complied by the author. 
Sources: Central Commision for Disciplinary Inspection of CCP and 
Ministry of Supervision, ed. 2005. Pandect of Current Anti-Corruption Laws and 
Regulations (dangfeng lianzheng he fanfubai xianxing fagui zhidu quanshu). 6 
vols. Beijing: Zhongguo Fangzheng Press. 
Online database: LawinfoChina (accessed via NUS Library). 
 
Alongside with tackling bribery in different areas, current anti-bribery policies 
also cover various major forms of bribe payments. Based on Yan Sun (2004: 28-9) 
and the review of various bribery cases reported, there are mainly nine forms of bribe 
payments in contemporary China. 17  Policies handling specific forms of bribe 
payments are reviewed according to each form as follows: 
1. Commission payments（回扣）: There are two kinds of commission 
payments: one is explicitly stated in accounts, the other is outside the accounts and 
transacted in secret. Only the latter form of commission payment is considered as 
illegal and as one form of bribery. Although sometimes controversial, commission 
payments are regulated by a number of rules and regulations. Table 8 shows that there 
                                                        
17 The first five forms of bribe payments follow Yan Sun’s (2004: 28-9) summary. The other four forms are 
summarized by the author based on various bribery cases reported. 
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are nine anti-bribery policies targeting at illegal commission payments since 1993. 
Indeed, after 1998, the regulations on illegal commission payments were becoming 
clearer and more comprehensive, covering major fields where bribery frequently 
occur, which include government procurement, public project contract, and other 
business activities involving public officials. 
Regarding the actors of bribery, both bribe giver and bribe taker are regulated. 
Though all public officials are regulated by the policies since 1993, the regulation and 
punishment of receiving illegal commission payments became clearer after 1998. In 
2003, for example, the Central Committee of CCP published a regulation which 
clearly states the punishment to party members involved in public service who use 
their position to take bribes in the form of commissions. Civil servants are also 
regulated by the Civil Servant Law. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate published a 
regulation in 2004 which clearly forbids procurators from receiving commission 
payments by using their power. 
2. Salaries, bonuses and free shares（工资、花红和干股）: Party and state 
officials may be pro forma employees of companies and get high salaries. Companies 
may also give bonuses or free shares to the officials in exchange of their “help” to 
gain benefits. As Table 8 shows, there have been seventeen anti-bribery policies 
handling these forms of bribe payments since 1989. These forms of bribery are 
explicitly and clearly forbidden by the policies. 
The policies can be divided into three groups. The first group of policies 
forbids public officials, especially high-rank cadres, from taking part-time or full-time 
 59
positions in enterprises. Public officials will also be punished if they are employed by 
enterprises and receive any payment from the employment after their retirement. The 
second group of policies is those that forbid the family members of public officials 
from being employed by companies which are in the jurisdiction of the officials. The 
third group regulates public officials’ behavior of receiving securities such as bonds 
and shares. Since 1989, such behavior has been forbidden. Public officials, either in 
dealing with foreign affairs or domestic affairs, should not receive any securities. In 
recent years, with the development of financial market, more and more bribers gave 
free shares to public officials instead of money. Thus, in 2007, CCDI, Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate and Supreme People’s Court all published regulations to 
specifically tackle this kind of bribery. 
3. Loans, purchases, and reimbursements（借款、购物、报销）: Officials may 
give IOUs to bribe-givers without indicating the date of return to cover their bribery 
behaviors. They may also “purchase commodities” and get the sale receipts without 
paying one cent. In some cases, officials reimburse their personal purchases from the 
bribe-givers. These forms of bribe payments have the covers of legal transaction 
records and are difficult to detect. There are nine anti-bribery policies tackling these 
forms of bribery since 1995. 
A regulation of tax official published in 1995 states that reimbursing purchases 
from tax payers is considered as embezzlement and will be punished according to the 
amount of money involved. However, the policies about reimbursement varied after 
1995. In 1996, the National Administration Bureau for Industry and Commerce 
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published a regulation in which any individual or company who reimburses the 
personal purchases of officials is considered as bribe giver. In 1997, officials who 
reimburse their personal purchases from individuals or organizations are regulated but 
whether this is bribery or embezzlement is unclear. Only since 1998 that this kind of 
reimbursement is regulated and punished as bribery. 
“Loans” and “purchases” without return date and payments by public officials 
are clearly forbidden since 1995. From general regulations on all public officials to 
special policies on officials in specific agencies, these kinds of behavior are explicitly 
claimed as bribery. 
4. Product trials（产品试用、鉴定）: Officials may receive gifts in the name of 
product trials and evaluation. This occurs most frequently in the occasions of issuing 
conference or evaluation meeting of new and luxury products. In 1988, such kind of 
bribery has already been clearly forbidden and regulated. In 1993, the Central 
Committee of CCP and State Council published a notice reemphasizing that such 
behavior should be forbidden and punished. After 1993, there is no new regulation on 
this form of bribery. 
5. Special occasion gifts（特殊场合的赠予）: In China, weddings and funerals 
of an official’ family members are occasions where bribery frequently takes place in 
the form of cash gifts, expensive and luxury product gifts, coupons and tokens, etc. 
Bribers will also banquet officials or pay for officials’ holidays. More recently, bribe 
payments happen in occasions when the officials’ children start their education at 
different levels. Paying for officials’ children to study overseas has become one of the 
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most common forms of bribery in contemporary China. There have been sixteen 
anti-bribery policies dealing with such forms of bribery since 1988. 
There are three kinds of policies. The first type explicitly prohibits bribe 
payments in the form of gifts in the weddings, funerals, and birthday parties of 
officials and their family members. The regulations on such behavior have been clear 
since 1988. The second kind of policies is about the banquet of officials by 
individuals or organizations. In 1995, CCDI and the Ministry of Supervision 
published a regulation in which the types of banquets by individuals or organizations 
are clearly prohibited in details. After this regulation, various policies were published 
by different agencies to deal with such behavior. Judicial officials, officials in charge 
of government procurement and contracting of public projects, and recruiters of arm 
forces are all prohibited from receiving any banquet by any interested party. The last 
type of policies regulates interested individual or organization’s payments of 
educational fees of officials or their children. In 1997, CCDI constituted several 
principles of the behavior of party officials, in which receiving others’ payments for 
their family members’ education is clearly prohibited and punished. This is reinforced 
in the CCP’s Disciplinary Regulation in 2003. Specific party and state agencies such 
as the Central Organization Department of CCP and the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate also enacted their own regulations to forbid such form of bribery. 
6. Beforehand or behindhand payments（事前或事后支付） : With the 
improvement of bribery detection by the anti-corruption agencies, bribery relationship 
has taken more and more sophisticated deceiving forms. According to a report of the 
 62
Procuratorial Daily, most bribers no longer give bribes to officials for a specific 
benefit at a given time. Instead, they increasingly tend to establish a stable, long-term 
relationship with the officials and give bribes in their daily contacts.18 That is, bribe 
payments are given either before or after the officials make benefits for the bribers. 
Some officials make benefits for the bribers when they are in their position and 
receive bribes after they retire. 
Previously, there was no clear provision regulating these kinds of payments for 
they were new. Since 2000, the CCP and Chinese government began to set specific 
and clear regulations on these kinds of bribery. They were further regulated and 
forbidden in 2007. In a reply to Jiangsu People’s Court in 2000, the Supreme People’s 
Court explicitly states that public officials who use their position to gain benefits for 
others and receive payments after they retire should be punished as bribe takers. In 
2001, the Ministry of Supervision published a notice to all supervisory agencies. In 
this notice, the punishments of public officials who gain benefits for others when they 
are in position and receive payments after they retire are very detailed. CCDI and 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate and Supreme People’s Court also constituted 
regulations to punish such form of bribery in 2007. 
7. Exchanges at unreasonable prices（用不合理的价格以交易形式贿赂）: 
Officials may buy products such as houses and cars from the companies at a price that 
is explicitly lower than the market price. They can also sell their houses or cars to the 
bribers at a price which is unreasonably higher that the market price. This form of 
                                                        
18 http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/2151363.html 
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bribery is not new. In 1988, there were already regulations to prohibit and punish it. 
However, it is not until the late 1990s when the real estate development and car 
industry boomed and the anti-corruption detection was improved that this form of 
bribery began to permeate. Since 2003, there have been four anti-bribery policies 
tackling this form of bribery. 
In 1988, “buying” products at unreasonably low prices was considered as 
receiving bribes, which is prohibited and punished. In CCDI’s regulation on party 
members in 2003 and Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s regulation on procurators in 
2004, such form of bribery is clearly forbidden. As this form of bribery became more 
serious with the development if economy, in 2007, CCDI and Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate and Supreme People’s Court reinforces the punishment of such 
behavior. 
8. Payments to family members, relatives, or mistress（支付给特定关系人）: 
Bribers may give bribe payments to the persons close to the officials. More and more 
officials do not receive bribes themselves but through their family members, relatives, 
or mistress. To deal with this form of bribery, since 1997, there have been eleven 
regulations and policies which clearly state that officials should be responsible for 
their family members’, relatives’, or mistress’ bribe-taking behaviors. Before 2007, all 
of these policies only deal with officials’ family members and relatives. However, 
reported bribery cases reveal that more and more officials tend to take bribes through 
their mistresses. In response to this new situation, in 2007, officials were at the first 
time supposed to be responsible for their mistress’ bribery misbehaviors. In the same 
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year, the Zhejiang People’s Court tried the first case of this form of bribery. According 
to the Procuratorial Daily, Zhao Zhanqi, the former Director of Transportation 
Department of Zhejiang, was accused of bribery for his mistress received 
550,000RMB bribes.19 
9. Payments through gambling（通过赌博贿赂）: Gambling per se is different 
from bribery. However, some bribers give their bribe payments to officials through 
gambling. Bribers deliberately lose their money to officials in the gamble. In 2005, a 
regulation published by the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate explicitly claims that such behavior is considered as bribery and should 
be punished according to anti-bribery laws and regulations. In 2007, this claim is 
further confirmed by the CCDI. 
 
Table 8. Anti-bribery policies tackling different forms of bribe payments 
forms of bribe 
payments 






I: 619 (1999); 645 (2002); 661 (2003); 665 (2003) 
II: 395 (1993); 402-3 (1996) 
V: 69-76 (2003); 563-5 (2004) 
2005a 
9 
salaries, bonuses and 
free shares  
（工资、花红和干
股） 
I: 282 (2000); 665 (2003) 
II: 4-5 (1997); 835 (1993); 837 (1993); 840-1 (1993); 
863-5 (1989); 868-9 (2004); 885-6 (1989); 958-8 
(2000); 967 (2002) 




                                                        
19 http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2007-07/17/content_6386506.htm 
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loans, purchases, and 
reimbursements  
（借款、购物、报销） 
I: 282 (2000); 665 (2003) 
II: 4-5 (1997); 141 (1998); 402-3 (1996) 
V: 69-76 (2003); 144-5 (1995); 552 (2002); 563-5 
(2004) 
9 
product trials  
（产品试用、鉴定） 




I: 277 (2000); 282 (2000); 665 (2003) 
II: 4-5 (1997); 125-6 (1997); 141 (1998); 402-3 
(1996); 835 (1993); 838 (1988); 840-1 (1993); 853-4 
(1995) 
V: 32 (1997); 69-76 (2003); 144-5 (1995); 552 













II: 838 (1988) 
V: 69-76 (2003); 144-5 (1995); 563-5 (2004) 
2007a; 2007b 
6 
payments to family 
members, relatives, 
or mistress  
（支付给特定关系
人） 
II: 161 (2004); 920-2 (2001); 923-5 (1997); 925-6 
(1997); 932 (1998); 934 (2000) 







2005b; 2007a; 2007b 3 
Note: 1. The format “I: 161 (2004)” denotes “vol. #: page # (enacted year of 
the policy)”. 
2. “2005a” denotes "Civil Servant Law of the People's Republic of China." 
3. “2005b” denotes “Explanations to Several Problems of Legal 
Applications in Handling Gambling Criminal Cases by Supreme People’s 
Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate.” 
4. “2007a” denotes “CCDI’s Several Regulations on Prohibiting 
Officials from Using Public Office for Illicit Benefits”. 
5. “2007b” denotes “Opinions on Several Problems of Legal 
Application in Handling Bribe-Taken Criminal Cases by Supreme People’s 
Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate”. 
Sources: 
Central Commision for Disciplinary Inspection of CCP and Ministry of 
Supervision, ed. 2005. Pandect of Current Anti-Corruption Laws and Regulations 
(dangfeng lianzheng he fanfubai xianxing fagui zhidu quanshu). 6 vols. Vol. I, II, 
and V. Beijing: Zhongguo Fangzheng Press. 
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Therefore, China has comprehensive anti-bribery policies to combat bribery. 
The policies were promptly updated with the changes of bribery situation. Thus, the 
anti-bribery policies per se are sufficient in the sense that they cover bribery in 
different areas and various forms of bribe payments. Policies regarding anti-bribery 
procedures are also established to smooth the functioning of implementation and 
coordination between different anti-bribery agencies. The planning of anti-bribery 
policies per se does not lead to the increase of bribery. If these policies are fully 
implemented, bribery can be expected to be largely reduced. Thus, the problems of 









Chapter 7 Implementation Problems of Anti-bribery Policies 
According to the previous literature review, the implementation problems are 
mainly due to the lack of horizontal and vertical supervision over power. Horizontally, 
the CCP dominates in the political system and there is no professional and 
independent anti-bribery agency to check the party and government’s use of power. 
Vertically, regarding the central-local relations, the central government’s oversight 
power on local governments has weakened due to decentralization in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. To boost local economic development, local government has been 
given more autonomy in policy making and implementation. As local government has 
been tied up with local economic development, many of them see bribery as a 
necessary evil for the growth of economy. Thus, anti-bribery policies will be 
considered as incompatible with the interests of the localities and will not be 
implemented sincerely. To explain the rising trend of bribery over the past decade, 
rather than examine the static power distribution between different governments, the 
following section will investigate whether there are any changes of these factors 
during the period of 1998 to 2007. 
The situation of central-local conflict of anti-bribery work in the period is 
examined by the perception of local officials’ view of bribery. A survey of the views 
of 121 local officials on anti-corruption work conducted by Hu and Guo (2001) shows 
that anti-corruption work is perceived as an obstacle to local economic development. 
The result implies that although theoretically no one will deny the importance of 
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combating bribery, in reality anti-bribery is seldom handled as the first priority. It is 
probably because that the major indicator to evaluate official performance is 
economic development in contemporary China (Sun 2008). According to the survey 
result, 33.3% of respondents agreed that anti-corruption should be the first task of the 
local government and 20% responded that it should be the second task. No officials 
responded that anti-corruption work is not important at all. However, when these 
respondents were asked of what position anti-corruption work was put in their 
practices, only 10% of them put it as the first priority and 10% second priority. 10% 
of the respondents said that in practice anti-corruption work is not treated as an 
important task. Since economic growth is the main indicator that affects the 
promotion of officials, it is not unusual to see economic development is prior to any 
other task including anti-corruption work. 
What is even worse, as localities compete with each other in economic 
development, they are prone to use whatever means to achieve their goals, legal or 
illegal. Under such circumstances, bribery is more likely to pervade. Indeed, many 
local officials hold the idea that bribery is an inevitable cost of, or even a necessary 
evil for, economic development. Although the Chinese government and CCP have 
introduced the new tools to recruit government and party cadres and to evaluate their 
performance in a more transparent and fair way since the mid-1990s, the situation is 
not improved. Instead, the personnel system reform of central and local government 
cadres provides even more incentives and opportunities for bribery (Sun 2008). This 
is because the economic growth is still the most important indicator of cadre 
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performance. 
Besides the economic development conciliarism and toleration of bribery, the 
power structure and institutional arrangement of anti-corruption agencies also 
contributes to the implementation problems of anti-bribery policies. The structural 
relationship between the Party and anti-corruption agencies has not fundamentally 
changed in the last decade. To the contrast, CCP’s intervention and control of 
anti-bribery procedure has been strengthened. Since 1978, all anti-bribery agencies 
are under the control of party committees at different levels in the sense of personnel, 
resource distribution, and priority setting (Manion 2004). The personnel control of the 
party committee is through the nomenklatura system. According to Manion (2004: 
125), by this system, “party committees vet and approve the appointment of all 
officials holding positions of any consequence.” 
To start with, it is worth noting that all staff of the procuratorates and the 
committees of discipline inspection of the CCP. It means that they need to follow the 
decisions of the party committees. Nominally, the chief procurator at the local level is 
appointed by the People’s Congress at the same level. Deputy procurators, members 
of the procuratorate’s standing committee, ordinary procurators are nominated by the 
chief procurator for the approval of the People’s Congress. In practice, the candidates 
must be vetted and approved by the party committee. This is also the case in the 
selection of secretaries, deputy secretaries and the standing committee members of the 
CCP’s committee of discipline inspection.20 In this way, party committees control the 
                                                        
20 For more detailed discussion of this numenklatura system, refer to Manion (2004: 124-6). 
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personnel of anti-corruption agencies. Such power structure and institutional 
arrangement lacks transparency and is impossible for the public to supervise. 
Moreover, within the party committee, power is concentrated in the hand of party 
secretary, which makes the supervision of the party secretary ineffective, if not 
impossible (Ren and Du 2008). 
Because of this personnel control, party committees can exercise influence on 
setting agenda or priorities of work for the anti-corruption agencies and the 
distribution of resources to conduct the anti-corruption tasks. The procuratorates’ 
investigating and prosecuting work is supervised by the party group21 within them. 
Through the party group, the party committee can intervene in the procuratorate’s 
decisions of conducting formal investigation to file bribery cases and of whether to 
suit the cases to the court. Many scholars blame the party’s intervention of 
anti-corruption agencies for contributing to the prevalence of corruption (Manion 
2004; He 2000; Cho 2001). The procuratorial statistics show that only 50% of 
accepted cases were filed after investigation every year since 1988. The small 
percentage of investigated officials (around 6%) transferred by the CCDI to the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the large gap between the accepted cases and 
filed cases by the procuratorates were often interpreted by Western scholars as a result 
or evidence of the CCP’s intervention of the anti-corruption agencies. 
CCP has made efforts to improve the enforcement of anti-bribery policies. The 
most significant initiative is the establishment of an inspector system in 2003. To deal 
                                                        
21 Party groups are organizations of the CCP established in non-CCP agencies to lead and supervise their work. 
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with the problem of lack of effective supervision over party secretaries at various 
levels and “first-in-commands” in state-owned enterprises and other central and local 
state organs, the CCDI and the Central Organization Department of CCP established 
an inspector system in 2003. This system consists of six inspecting groups to 
supervise local officials, one inspecting group to monitor financial departments, four 
groups to inspect state-owned enterprises and two groups to inspect central state 
agencies. The inspector system targets at the high-level officials, especially officials 
of provincial level and ministry level. Each inspecting group will be sent to one 
province for three months to oversee and push the implementation of anti-corruption 
policies. The creation of the inspector system helps to discover and handle bribery 
involving high-level officials. It was also expected that such a system can overcome 
the problem of information dissymmetry between central and local government and 
party agencies. However, since the inspecting groups only stays in a province for 
three months, its effectiveness in improving local anti-bribery work is doubtable. 
Many scholars are skeptical about the effectiveness of this system, holding that it does 
not touch the fundamental cause of corruption at the local level.22 
With the effect of the inspector system, CCP’s intervention into anti-bribery 
work has been strengthened. Bribery cases involving high-level officials are handled 
by the CCDI first. Even if the cases are discovered by the procuratorate, they should 
be transferred to CCDI for further investigation. Only after CCDI finishes its 
investigation and decide that the cases be transferred to the Supreme People’s 
                                                        
22 http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/szyw/200804/11/t20080411_15125509.shtml 
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Procuratorate, judiciary procedure can start. CCP’s intervention of investigation of 
high-level officials’ corruption cases gives more room for political manipulation of 
anti-bribery work and thus exacerbates the problems of implementing anti-bribery 
policies. 
One may expect that the inspector system will lead to the increase of the 
number of bribery cases filed by the procuratorate. However, as the majority of 
bribery cases are committed by low-level officials (around 88%), which may not be 
directly affected by the inspector system, the increased number of bribery cases filed 
by the procuratorates are not because of the enforcement of this system. Moreover, 
around 80% of the procuratorial bribery cases are from the reports of the citizens 
rather than from the CCDI. 23 The increased number of filed bribery cases by the 
procuratorates is not due to the enforcement of the inspector system of the CCDI. This 
also indicates that the inspector system alone cannot solve the problem of bribery. 
Further political institutional reforms are still in need. 
Regarding the quality of anti-bribery agencies, there was a reform of 
recruitment system for judiciary officials in 2002. Since 2002, all procurators and 
judges are required to pass the national judiciary examination. The direct result one 
can expect is the improvement in professionalism of anti-bribery personnel. However, 
as discussed above, since the party committee has the decision-making power of 
personnel and resources distribution of anti-corruption agencies at the same level, 
anti-corruption agencies have to be dependent on the party’s control. As a result, the 
                                                        
23 http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/101380/9558519.html 
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capacity of anti-bribery agencies to conduct bribery detection work is still limited. 
Summing up, since anti-bribery policies are comprehensive and well-designed, 
the explanation of the growth of bribery since 1998 should be found from the 
implementation problems of these policies. In the period of 1998-2007, the situation 
of horizontal and vertical factors, such as the weakness and lack of independence of 
anti-bribery agencies, and central-local inconsistency that cause implementation 
failure of anti-bribery policies has not been improved. Instead, the party’s intervention 
and control of anti-bribery work has been strengthened particularly regarding cases 
involving high-rank officials. As a result, there would be more room for political 
maneuver in the implementation of anti-bribery policies. Therefore, the worsened 
situation of implementation of anti-bribery policies may contribute to the surge of 
bribery in the same period. 
The examination of implementation problems suffers from limitations. First, 
since the thesis would concentrate on the main goal of revealing the trend of bribery 
in the past decade and examine several major possible factors that shape the trend, 
there is no enough time and space for detailed in-depth examination of all factors 
related to implementation problems. Second, due to the absence of internal data to 
develop more detailed and to some extent more accurate indicators to measure the 
success and failure of implementation, the examination only broadly reviews the 
major factors that affect the effectiveness of implementation. Thus, further study on 
the implementation problem is suggested. 
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Chapter 8 Government’s Involvement in Economic Activities and Bribery 
In this chapter, I test whether the external environmental factors explain the 
aggravation of bribery in China in the period of 1998-2007. The dependent variable is 
the procuratorial statistics of filed bribery cases. Major explanatory variables are real 
estate investment, public investment, and government procurement. Both the 
national-level data and the provincial-level data will be used. Inflation rate, provincial 
governor change and provincial party secretary change are control variables in the 
provincial models. The trend and characteristics of the statistics are summarized in the 
following. 
Figure 3, Figure 4 and Table 9 show the description of the national-level data. 
As Table 9 shows, the number of observation is ten, covering the period from 1998 to 
2007. Figure 3 shows the trend of bribery cases in this period. As we can see, the 
general trend of bribery is increasing, from 8,759 in 1998 to 12,226 in 2007. After a 
drop in 1999, the number of bribery cases keeps increasing till 2003, when the 
number drops by 1.6% compared to 2002. From 2003 to 2005, the trend is 
approximately constant. However, after 2005, there is a notable rising trend, 
increasing by 17% from 2005 to 2007. 
Figure 4 shows the trends of real estate investment, public investment, and 
government procurement from 1998 to 2007. Since 1998, real estate investment and 
government procurement has been increased dramatically and continuously, even after 
adjusted with the inflation rate. According to Table 9, real estate investment has 
increased from 361.44 billion RMB in 1998 to 1.07 trillion RMB in 2007. The mean 
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of the amount in this period is 650.61 billion RMB, with the standard deviation of 
245.35. The increase of government procurement is even more notable, with 3.1 
billion RMB in 1998 and 197.30 billion RMB in 2007. The mean of government 
procurement is 92.94 billion RMB and the standard deviation is 69.74 billion RMB. 
The trend of public investment is more fluctuating. The amount of public investment 
decrease in from 1999 to 2000. In the period of 2000-2005, there is an increasing 
trend of public investment. The amount drops slightly in 2006 and increases again in 
2007. According to Table 9 and Figure 4, the minimal amount (1.59 trillion RMB) is 
in 1999, while the maximal (1.84 trillion RMB) is in 2007. The mean of the amount in 
this period is 1.68 trillion RMB, with the standard deviation of 90.77. 
 
Figure 3. The Trend of Prosecutional Bribery Cases (1998-2007) (Unit: case) 
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Figure 4. Trends of explanatory variables (1998-2007) (Unit: 100 million RMB) 
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbooks 1999-2008 
 
Table 9. Summary of major variables at the national level 
Variable Observation Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum
Bribery cases 10 10339.40 1202.00 8192 12226 
Real estate investment 10 6506.07 2453.48 3614.23 10704.69 
Public investment 10 16833.51 907.68 15872.49 18404.30 
Government procurement 10 929.44 697.43 31 1972.95 
 
Figure 5-7 and Table 10 describe the trends of bribery, real estate investment 
and public investment at the provincial level in the period of 1998-2007. Table 10 also 
summarizes the control variables, namely, inflation rate, change of provincial 
governor and provincial party secretary. As Table 10 shows, 70 observations are used 
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(1998-2007). Trends of bribery vary in different regions. Except Anhui, there is no 
continuously increasing trend at the provincial level. From Figure 5 and Table 10 we 
can see that there are considerable variations between different localities. The number 
of bribery cases is the largest in Henan. Beijing and Tianjin have the smallest number 
of bribery cases. Comparing the year 1998 and 2007, only Shanghai and Tianjin do 
not show the increase of bribery cases, while other five regions increase. 
Regarding real estate investment, according to Figure 6, except Beijing and 
Shanghai, all regions present continuously increasing trends. For Beijing, the amount 
of real estate investment increases till 2005, when it drops to around the level of 2003. 
The amount keeps constant in 2006 and increases in 2007. The trend in Shanghai is 
the most different. After a decrease in 1999, the amount increase continuous from 
2000 to 2004. However, in 2005-2007, the amount drops dramatically. 
Figure 7 shows that Anhui, Henan, Chongqing and Jilin have increasing trends 
of public investment. The trend in Tianjin is almost constant. In Beijing, the amount 
of public investment increases from 1998 to 2001, but decrease afterwards. The trend 
in Shanghai is different. After a dramatic drop from 1998 to 2001, the amount of 





Figure 5. Trends of prosecutional bribery cases in seven provinces and 
directly-governed-cities (1998-2007) (Unit: case) 
Sources: various provincial statistical yearbooks 1999-2008 
Figure 6. Trends of real estate investment in seven provinces and 
directly-governed-cities (1998-2007) (Unit: 100 million RMB) 









1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007











1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
beijing tianjin jilin shanghai anhui henan chongqing
 79
Figure 7. Trends of public investment in seven provinces and 
directly-governed-cities (1998-2007) (Unit: 100 million RMB) 
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbooks 1999-2008 
Table 10. Summary of major variables at the provincial level 
Variable Observation Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum
Bribery cases 70 261.23 148.03 51 609 
Real estate investment 70 264.23 213.73 36.38 774.52 
Public investment 70 906.15 499.54 358.94 2302.70 
GRP Index (Inflation rate) 70 165.84 54.80 100 309 
Change of provincial 
governor 
70 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Change of provincial party 
secretary 
70 0.23 0.42 0 1 
 
This session use time series pool data analysis with fixed effect approach to 
test Hypothesis 3 and 4. To find out better regression models, I run ten regression 
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is shown in the Appendix. At the national level, real estate investment, public 
investment and government procurement are the explanatory variables. Model 7 in the 
Appendix table examines the relation between bribery and these three variables. The 
regression result is shown in Table 11. The overall model fit of Model 7 is high 
(F-statistic=22.42, p-value=0.00). Given the large adjusted R-squared (0.88), we can 
also conclude that the growth of real estate investment, public investment and 
government procurement explain the variation of bribery well. However, regression 
coefficients of real estate investment and government procurement are not statistically 
significant (p=0.10 and p=0.43). Moreover, although the estimated coefficient of 
public investment is statistically significant (p=0.02), the value of coefficient is 
negative, which means that with the increase of public investment, bribery will 
decrease. This is contradictory to the common knowledge that given the imperfect 
institutional design, the growth of public investment provides more opportunities for 
officials to take bribes. 
Table 11. Regression result of Model 7 (national level) 
                                     Coefficient      Standard Error 
Intercept  20060.77***      3840.10 
Real estate investment 1.20              0.62 
Public investment                         -0.94**           0.29 
Government procurement                  -1.75              2.04 
Number of observations = 10 
Degree of freedom = (3, 6) 
F-statistics = 22.42  
p-value = 0.00         
Adjusted R-squared = 0.88 
Note: Estimations performed using Stata 10.0. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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One possible cause of the insignificance of regression coefficients of real 
estate investment and government procurement and the negative coefficient of public 
investment is multicollinearity of the independent variables. To test whether there is 
such a problem, we can examine the correlation between the variables, which is 
shown is Table 12. We can see that the correlation coefficients between the 
independent variables are high, indicating the problem of multicollinearity. The 
correlation between real estate investment and government procurement is 0.9937. To 
further detect the problem of multicollinearity, variance inflation factor (VIF) is also 
used. The mean of VIF is 75.18, which is very high. Specifically, the values of VIF of 
real estate investment and government procurement are 119.20 and 102.79 
respectively, while the VIF of public investment is much lower (VIF=3.54). This 
result indicates that the problem of multicollinearity exists between real estate 
investment and government procurement. There are two possible ways to reduce the 
multicollinearity problem: one is to add more observations, the other is take off the 
multicollinear variable from the model. Since additional data is unavailable, the 
practical way in this study is to take either real estate investment or government 
procurement out of the model. If we take off the variable “government procurement” 





Table 12. Correlation coefficients of each explanatory variable (national level) 
  Real estate 
 investment 
Public investment Government 
procurement 
Real estate investment 1.00   
Public investment 0.80 1.00  
Government procurement 0.99 0.76 1.00 
 
Table 13. Regression result of Model 4 (national level) 
                                     Coefficient      Standard Error 
Intercept  19866.66***      3759.344 
Real estate investment 0.67***           0.09 
Public investment                         -0.83**           0.25 
Number of observations = 10 
Degree of freedom = (2, 7) 
F-statistics = 34.58  
p-value = 0.00         
Adjusted R-squared = 0.88 
Note: Estimations performed using Stata 10.0. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
As Table 13 presents, even after taking off government procurement, the 
overall model fit of Model 4 is still high (F-statistic=34.58, p-value=0.00). The 
adjusted R-squared (0.88) is as high as that of Model 7 (0.88). Thus, the growth of 
real estate investment and public investment can explain the variation of bribery well. 
The regression coefficient of real estate investment is positive and statistically 
significant (p=0.00). Regarding the practical significance of the regression coefficient 
of real estate investment, the increase of 100 million yuan in real estate investment is 
correlated with an increase of 0.67 case of bribery. Considering that the magnitude of 
money invested in every real estate development program is quite large, we can 
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reckon that almost every single real estate development program is involved with 
bribery. This is consistent with the common sense that in the transitional economy, the 
growth of real estate investment provides more opportunities for officials to commit 
bribery. However, the estimated coefficient of public investment is still negative, 
which is not in accordance with common knowledge. Although the VIF of both 
independent variables is smaller than 10, the mean VIF (2.73) is considerably larger 
than 1. Considering the high correlation coefficient between real estate investment 
and public investment in Table 13, there is still possibility of multicollinearity, though 
much reduced compared to Model 7. 
The above analysis result indicates the limitations of the national-level models. 
The most critical problem is that the sample size is too small. The number of years is 
very small, which leads to a small number of observations. As a result, the degree of 
freedom is also too low. The problem of multicollinearity is also largely resulted from 
the small sample size because the small sample size fails to stabilize standard errors of 
estimated coefficients. To solve these problems, the provincial-level data can be used. 
Rather than using the absolute values in each year, differences between years should 
be examined. The use of panel data at the provincial level can reduce the possibility of 
multicollinearity problem. 
Three models are constructed at the provincial level, which are Model 8 to 10 
as shown in the Appendix table. Model 8 includes real estate investment and public 
investment as explanatory variables and inflation rate as control variable. The changes 
of provincial governor and provincial party secretary are dummy variables. The 
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regression result of Model 8 is shown in Table 14. 
 
Table 14. Regression result of Model 8 (provincial level) 
                                     Coefficient      Standard Error 
Intercept  134.61**         56.66 
Real estate investment -0.39***          0.10 
Public investment                         0.12***          0.04 
GRP Index (inflation rate)                  0.67** 0.31 
Change of provincial governor (dummy) -34.12           40.26 
Change of provincial party secretary (dummy)   71.62*          40.66 
Number of observations = 70 
Degree of freedom = (5, 64) 
F-statistics = 4.91  
p-value = 0.00         
Adjusted R-squared = 0.22 
Note: Estimations performed using Stata 10.0. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
As Table 14 shows, the model fit of Model 8 is fairly high (F-statistic=4.91, 
p-value=0.00). However, the adjusted R-squared is very small (0.22), which means 
that the independent variables can only explain around 22% of the variation of bribery. 
Regarding the regression coefficients, both the coefficients of real estate investment 
and public investment are statistically significant. However, the coefficient of real 
estate investment is negative, which is not consistent with common understanding. 
This model also suffers from the problem of multicollinearity. To reduce the 
multicollinearity problem, the time series pool analysis with fixed effect approach is 
applied, which leads to Model 9. Year is included as a dummy variable so that the 
model becomes time series model with fixed effect.  
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Table 15 shows the regression result of Model 9. The overall model fit of 
Model 9 has been improved (F-statistic=6.17, p-value=0.00) compared to Model 8. 
The adjusted R-squared (0.51) is considerably higher than that of Model 8. Thus, in 
Model 9, after controlling years, the growth of real estate investment and public 
investment can explain around 51% of the variation of bribery. The regression 
coefficients show that both the coefficients of real estate investment and public 
investment are statistically significant. However, as the result in Model 8, the 
coefficient of real estate investment is also negative, contradictory the common sense. 
The estimated coefficient of inflation rate is negative and statistically significant 
(p=0.00). The regression coefficients of provincial governor change and provincial 
party secretary change are not statistically significant (p=0.45, p=0.26). Regarding the 
dummy variable of years, the coefficient of each year is negative and statistically 
significant (p=0.00). It indicates that the variation between years is significant. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficient of each year decreases from 1998 to 








Table 15. Regression result of Model 9 (provincial level) 
                                     Coefficient      Standard Error 
Intercept  2327.89***        332.69 
Real estate investment -0.36***          0.08 
Public investment                         0.12***          0.03 
GRP Index (inflation rate)                  -7.42*** 1.23 
Change of provincial governor (dummy) -26.60           35.23 
Change of provincial party secretary (dummy)   40.09           35.36 
Year of 1998 (dummy) -1426.37***       215.58 
Year of 1999 (dummy)                    -1349.24***       204.33 
Year of 2000 (dummy)                    -1242.94***       191.03 
Year of 2001 (dummy) -1114.93***       179.24  
Year of 2002 (dummy) -1020.85*** 161.17 
Year of 2003 (dummy) -875.31*** 145.54 
Year of 2004 (dummy) -706.68***   119.01 
Year of 2005 (dummy) -535.17*** 96.50 
Year of 2006 (dummy) -268.23*** 71.00 
Number of observations = 70 
Degree of freedom = (14, 55) 
F-statistics = 6.17  
p-value = 0.00         
Adjusted R-squared = 0.51 
Note: Estimations performed using Stata 10.0. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
To test whether regional effects are significant, provinces are added to Model 
9 as dummy variables. Thus, we get Model 10 as shown in the Appendix table. The 
regression result of Model 10 is shown in Table 16. Compared to Model 8 and 9, the 
overall model fit of Model 10 is the highest (F-statistic=28.00, p-value=0.00). The 
adjusted R-squared is considerably high (0.89). Thus, we can conclude that, at the 
provincial level, the growth of real estate investment and public investment can 
explain the growth of bribery very well. According to Table 16, both the estimated 
coefficients of real estate investment and public investment are positive and 
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statistically significant (p=0.05, p=0.06). Regarding the practical significance of the 
coefficients, real estate investment has more significant impact on the increase of 
bribery than public investment. If real estate investment increases by 4 million yuan, 
the cases of bribery will increase by 1. One the other hand, to increase bribery case by 
1, public investment needs to increase by 1 billion yuan. This result indicates that the 
growth of real estate investment and public investment are associated with the 
increase of bribery case, but real estate investment has more significant impact on 
bribery in practice. This is consistent with Rose-Ackerman’s (1997) and Sun’s (2004) 
arguments that the growth of development programs provides more opportunities for 
bribery. 
The regression coefficient of inflation rate is negative and statistically 
significant (p=0.01), which is consistent with the result of Model 9. It suggests that 
Quade’s (2007) finding of a plausible positive correlation between inflation and the 
revealed corruption cases does not apply to bribery cases. Also consistent with Model 
9 is that the estimated coefficients of provincial governor change and provincial party 
secretary change in Model 10 are not statistically significant (p=0.86, p=0.25). 
Variation between years is also significant. Furthermore, the magnitude of the 
coefficient of each year shows the same decreasing pattern as in Model 9, suggesting 
that after controlling the regional effects, there is still an increasing trend of bribery 
from 1998 to 2007 at the provincial level. This is correspondent to the trend at the 
national level, which is discussed in the first argument. 
All estimated coefficients of the province dummy variables are negative and 
 88
statistically significant (p=0.00). This result implies that regional effects are 
significant. The situation of bribery varies among different provinces. In Model 10, 
Henan is the base line for comparison. As all estimated coefficients of province 
variable are significantly negative, we can conclude that the situation of bribery in 
Henan is the most serious. Specifically, if we look at the magnitude of the coefficients, 
we can find that among the rest six regions, Beijing and Shanghai have the lowest 
level of bribery. The following regions are Tianjin, Jilin, Chongqing, and Anhui. One 
characteristics of such regional variation is that, in general, the situation of bribery is 
less serious in more developed regions than in less developed ones. Compared to 
Henan and Anhui, the other four regions are more developed. Among the seven 
localities, Henan is the least developed province. Accordingly, bribery is much worse 
in Henan than in other localities, followed by Anhui. 
 
Table 16. Regression result of Model 10 (provincial level) 
                                     Coefficient      Standard Error 
Intercept  1116.77***        297.27 
Real estate investment 0.24**           0.12 
Public investment                         0.10*            0.05 
GRP Index (inflation rate)                  -2.73*** 0.99 
Change of provincial governor (dummy) -3.19            17.36 
Change of provincial party secretary (dummy)   20.74           17.73 
Year of 1998 (dummy) -532.25***        181.33 
Year of 1999 (dummy)                    -494.35***        172.36 
Year of 2000 (dummy)                    -437.68 ***        161.56 
Year of 2001 (dummy) -388.21**         148.95  
Year of 2002 (dummy) -375.68*** 134.01 
Year of 2003 (dummy) -333.78*** 116.61 
Year of 2004 (dummy) -275.84***   93.40 
Year of 2005 (dummy) -214.29*** 70.71 
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Year of 2006 (dummy) -89.26* 45.92 
Beijng (dummy) -466.67*** 62.84 
Tianjin (dummy) -296.38*** 33.93 
Jilin (dummy) -209.28*** 34.94 
Shanghai (dummy) -448.46*** 80.46 
Anhui (dummy) -127.28*** 26.50 
Chongqing (dummy)        -133.88***   29.43 
Number of observations = 70 
Degree of freedom = (20, 49) 
F-statistics = 28.00  
p-value = 0.00         
Adjusted R-squared = 0.89 
Note: Estimations performed using Stata 10.0. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The analysis results of provincial-level models confirm the finding in the 
literature review that the increase of real estate investment and public investment, 
which indicate rent seeking and pre-market reforms, provides more opportunities for 
bribery and thus is positively associated with bribery. The negative coefficients of 
inflation rate in Model 9 and 10 suggests that Quade’s (2007) finding of a plausible 
positive correlation between inflation and the revealed corruption cases does not 
apply to bribery cases. Moreover, there is no significant correlation between changes 
of provincial governor and party secretary and bribery. The comparison of the results 
of Model 8, 9, and 10 shows that bribery increases every year from 1998 to 2007. 
Provincial effect is significant, which implies that there is no single one method of 
anti-bribery that would be effective for all provinces. When designing and 
implementing anti-bribery policies, regional variation should be taken into account. 
As only seven provinces’ bribery data is available, the sample size of Model 8, 
9, and 10 is still very small. As a result, the degree of freedom is also too small. 
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Although using time series pool analysis with fixed effect approach can reduce the 
problem of multicollinearity, due to the small number of observations and degree of 
freedom, the result still has high risk of bias. Thus, the result of regression should be 




















Chapter 9 Conclusion 
This chapter aims at concluding this thesis through checking whether the 
objectives stated in the introduction of this study have been met. To do so, the 
following section will revisit the research objectives discussed in the introduction 
chapter, summarize the findings of the study and provide conclusions based on the 
findings. The analysis results of the previous three chapters will be summarized in this 
section. Suggestions for future research will be discussed. Importantly, the 
contribution of this research to the current knowledge about corruption and 
particularly bribery in China and to the practical anti-bribery work will be clarified. In 
addition, the approach of research in this study will be summarized. 
The overall aim of this research was to advance an understanding of the 
situation of corruption in China, particularly the trend of bribery in the period of 
1998-2007 and the possible factors that shape this trend. The specific research 
objectives were to examine whether bribery has worsened or not since 1998 by 
analyzing the procuratorial statistics, explore possible explanations of the trend of 
bribery which cover both the internal institutional factors and external environmental 
factors, and formulate recommendations on practical anti-bribery work and further 
research. 
To these aims, I first reviewed current English and Chinese literature on the 
causes of bribery in China. According to the current literature, factors that can explain 
bribery in China can be categorized into internal institutional factors and external 
environmental factors. Internal institutional factors include poor anti-bribery policy 
 92
design and failure in policy implementation. The failure of policy implementation is 
mainly due to lack of supervision over power both in horizontal and vertical power 
structure in the political system. External factors consist of rent seeking due to greater 
market exposure, and pre-market reforms such as outsourcing and partnership. 
Based on the literature review, I figured out the knowledge gaps to be filled in: 
(1) a trend of the level of bribery awaits more empirical studies; (2) there is still a 
debate on whether the weakness of anti-corruption measures lies in inefficient 
anti-corruption policies per se or the failure to fully implement these policies, or both; 
(3) another gap resides in whether the rampant bribery in China is mainly a result of 
greater market exposure and pre-market reforms rather than internal anti-bribery. 
To fill in the knowledge gaps found in the literature review, I proposed two 
research questions to answer. The first question is whether bribery has worsened in 
China, and the second one is what the possible explanations for the upward pattern of 
bribery are. Procuratorate statistics are used to calculate the trend of bribery from 
1998 to 2007. Statistics of embezzlement and misappropriation were also used to 
compare with bribery. The analysis showed that the number of bribery cases has 
increased by around forty percent from 1998 to 2007. This result turned out to be 
valid even after considering possible validity and reliability threats such as political 
influence, discretion power of anti-bribery agencies, improvement of bribery 
detection techniques, etc. 
Internal institutional factors and external environmental factors were examined 
to test whether they explain the increase of bribery in the last decade. Regarding the 
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internal factors, I investigated both policy design and implementation problems by 
qualitative method. A series of current major anti-bribery policies at the central level 
in the period of 1998-2007 were reviewed. These policies include: laws, government 
and party regulations and supplementary documents. The finding of this review is that 
unlike common criticisms on the inefficient anti-corruption policies, current 
anti-bribery policies are comprehensive in the sense of tackling bribery in different 
areas, clarifying the coordination of different anti-bribery agencies, standardizing the 
procedure of anti-bribery work, and covering various forms of bribe payments. In the 
section that followed, I investigated whether there have been changes for the factors 
that cause implementation failure of anti-bribery policies in the period of 1998-2007. 
These factors include the weakness of anti-bribery agencies, central-local 
inconsistency and CCP’s unrestricted power. The finding is that the situation of 
implementation problems has not been improved. Instead, the situation has been 
worsened because the party’s intervention and control of anti-bribery work has been 
strengthened particularly regarding cases involving high-rank officials. Therefore, I 
conclude that the worsened situation of implementation of anti-bribery policies 
contributes to the increase of bribery in last decade. 
After examining the internal factors, I turned to test whether external 
environmental factors contribute to the growth of bribery. To this end, several 
multiple linear regressions were run. The dependent variable was the procuratorial 
statistics of filed bribery cases. Major explanatory variables were real estate 
investment, public investment, and government procurement. Both the national-level 
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data and the provincial-level data were used. Inflation rate, provincial governor 
change and provincial party secretary change were control variables in the provincial 
models. 
The national level analysis suffered from the problem of the sample size and 
multicollinearity. Due to the multicollinearity problem, the estimated coefficients of 
real estate investment, public investment, and government procurement were 
inconsistent with the finding in the literature review that the growth of these three 
factors will provide more opportunities for bribery. To overcome these problems, 
provincial-level models were constructed as time series pool analysis with fixed effect. 
Instead of using the absolute values in each year, differences between years should be 
examined to weaken the autocorrelation problem. Also, the use of panel data at the 
provincial level can partially weather the possibility of multicollinearity problem by 
increasing the degree of freedom, which increases consistency of estimates. 
The analysis results of provincial-level models confirmed the finding in the 
literature review that the increase of real estate investment and public investment, 
measuring rent seeking and pre-market reforms respectively, provides more 
opportunities for bribery and thus is positively associated with bribery. The negative 
coefficients of inflation rate in provincial models suggested that Quade’s (2007) 
finding of a plausible positive correlation between inflation and the revealed 
corruption cases does not apply to bribery cases. Additionally, there was no significant 
correlation between changes of provincial governor and party secretary and bribery. 
The analysis result also showed that bribery increases every year from 1998 to 2007 at 
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the provincial level, with an average increase of 532 cases if we compare the year 
1998 and 2007. Provincial effect was significant, implying that there was no single 
anti-bribery method that would be effective for all provinces. Therefore, when 
designing and implementing anti-bribery policies, regional variations should be taken 
into account. 
Accordingly, the increase of briery can be explained by the worsening of 
anti-bribery policy implementation problems and the growth of real estate investment 
and public investment. There was no significant effect of changes of provincial 
governor and party secretary on bribery. 
There are several limitations of this study, however. First of all, due to the 
limit of space and research scope, detailed examinations of the content and the 
relationship of every major anti-bribery policy were not conducted in this research. 
The discussion of changes of implementation problems was not deeply explored, 
especially regarding the resources distribution and coordination among different 
anti-bribery agencies. Thus, further research is required to provide more detailed 
examinations of the planning and implementing of anti-bribery policies. 
More importantly, one challenge of the validity of the argument that the 
worsening of anti-corruption implementation problems explains the growth of bribery 
is that given the same situation of worsening implementation problems, 
embezzlement decreases. Since this thesis focuses on examining the trend of bribery 
and exploring the possible explanations of it, anti-embezzlement policies are not 
reviewed. However, one possible answer to the challenge is that, even embezzlement 
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may face similar implementation problems, its decrease is mainly a consequence of 
the administrative institutional changes. Since embezzlement and bribery possess 
different features, they are expected to react differently to the same administrative 
changes and changes of the social and economic systems. Nevertheless, the 
comparison of these two types of corruption is out of the scope of this research. 
Another limitation of this study is the incomplete data. The sample size at both 
the national and provincial levels is too small. Data are only available in seven out of 
thirty-two provinces, which limit the implication of the analysis results. Moreover, 
since only the procuratorate statistics of bribery are available, it can bring about a bias 
in the understanding of causes of the trend of bribery. Thus, further research using 
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TABLE 1. Analysis of influential factors of Level of Bribery  
(Bribery = real estate investment + public investment + government procurement) 
Model 
Bribery                 (1)             (2)            (3)             (4)            (5)         
Real estate              0.43             --             --             0.67           0.03 
investment              (0.08)***                                     (0.09)***       (0.78) 
 
Public                   --             0.62            --             -0.86           -- 
investment                             (0.41)                         (0.25)** 
 
Government              --              --            1.52             --            1.43 
procurement                                          (0.29)***                      (2.75) 
 
Change of provincial       --              --             --              --              -- 
governor 
 
Change of provincial       --              --             --              --              --         
party secretary 
 
Inflation rate              --              --             --              --              -- 
 
 
Year                    --              --             --              --              --        
(Dummy)                                                                                      
 
Province                 --              --             --              --              -- 
(Dummy) 
 
Constant               7550.36         -93.02          8929.86         19866.66       8846.82  
                      (579.40)***      (6974.17)       (330.29)***      (3759.34)***   (2574.16)** 
 





TABLE 1 (Continued). Analysis of influential factors of Level of Bribery  
(Bribery = real estate investment + public investment + government procurement) 
Model 
Bribery                 (6)             (7)            (8)             (9)            (10)        
Real estate               --             1.20           -0.39           -0.36           0.24 
investment                             (0.63)          (0.10)***       (0.08)***       (0.12)** 
 
Public                  -0.62           -0.95          0.12            0.12            0.10       
investment              (0.28)**        (0.29)**        (0.04)***       (0.03)***        (0.05)*     
 
Government             2.13            -1.75           --              --              -- 
procurement             (0.36)***       (2.04)                                              
 
Change of Provincial       --              --            -34.12          -26.60          -3.19 
Governor (Dummy)                                    (40.26)          (35.23) (17.36)  
 
Change of Provincial       --              --            71.62           40.09          20.74 
Party Secretary (Dummy)                                (40.66)*         (35.36)       (17.73) 
 
Inflation rate              --              --            0.67            -7.42          -2.73 
                                                     (0.31)**         (1.23)***    (0.99)*** 
 
Year                     --              --            --            Suppressed      Suppressed   
(Dummy)                                                                                      
 
Province                 --              --             --            Suppressed     Suppressed    
(Dummy) 
 
Constant               18813.59        20060.77        134.61          2327.89        1116.77  
                      (4452.88)***    (3840.10)***      (56.67)**       (332.69)***    (297.27)*** 
 
Note: Estimations performed using Stata 10.0. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 
